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The Identification of Customary International Law: 
Institutional and Methodological Pluralism in 
U.S. Courts 
Noah A. Bialos 
Abstract 
 
It is well established that there is a consensus, two-element approach to the identification 
of customary international law. Among international courts and organizations, a customary rule 
is identified based on evidence of a general practice by states, which is accepted as law. Customary 
international law, however, is also subject to identification at the national level. For centuries, 
questions regarding the existence and content of customary international rules have arisen in 
national courts. Given their own institutionalized methods of resolving legal ambiguity, national 
courts are thus routinely faced with a normative conflict: is the appropriate method for identifying 
rules of customary international law located in the national or international realm? By using 
customary international law as a case study, this Article offers a more nuanced understanding of 
how international law is localized into U.S. courts. While prevailing theories posit that the 
diffusion of international rules results in national acceptance or rejection, this empirical analysis 
demonstrates how normative pluralism may also generate hybridization. As international 
integration accelerated after World War II, U.S. judges increasingly relied on hybrid models of 
decision-making that sought legitimacy within both the national and international legal systems. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is well established that customary rules are a source of international law. 
What is less settled is how to identify the existence and content of such rules. 
Indeed, the very premise of customary international law (CIL)—that the rules are 
not necessarily legislatively or textually confirmed—reveals the inherent difficulty 
of identifying extant rules. This identification question has recently generated 
renewed interest in the consensus international approach to identifying the rules 
of CIL, or, put differently, the customary approach to identifying CIL. 
Under the prevailing approach at the international level, a rule of CIL is 
identified based on two elements: (1) evidence of a general practice by states that 
is (2) accepted as law.1 Although there is some disagreement around the margins, 
the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, as well as the consistent 
practice of numerous other international bodies, reflects international consensus 
on this two-element approach. 
The International Law Commission (ILC) has recently worked to textually 
confirm and develop the consensus international method, in part because of 
divergent approaches at the national level.2  National divergence is seen as a threat 
to custom’s stability and legitimacy and is thought to arise from ignorance among 
national judges about the international approach.3 In line with positivist and 
process-based theories of international law, the prevailing view is that there is a 
singular, true international approach that national judges have internalized or 
purposively decided to adopt.4 This Article challenges such actor-centric theories 
by examining whether the experience of U.S. courts regarding identification 
questions is more phenomenological5 than previously understood. 
 
1  Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 
993.  
2  Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. A/70/10, at 32–42 
(2015). 
3  Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/66/10, at 305 (2011) 
[hereinafter U.N. Doc A/66/10] (“There are differing approaches to the formation and 
identification of customary international law. Yet an appreciation of the process of its formation 
and identification is essential for all those who have to apply the rules of international law. Securing 
a common understanding of the process could be of considerable practical importance. This is so 
not least because questions of customary international law increasingly fall to be dealt with by those 
who may not be international law specialists, such as those working in the domestic courts of many 
countries, those in government ministries other than Ministries for Foreign Affairs, and those 
working for non-governmental organizations.”).  
4  See, for example, HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY 3 (2011) (describing the positivist conception of international law).  
5  Phenomenology refers to the structures and models of consciousness and behavior that shape the 
decisions and arguments of individuals. It is to be distinguished from ontology, which considers 
decisions and arguments to be driven purely by analysis and rationality. See Phenomenology, STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Dec. 16, 2013), http://perma.cc/9G7V-P6RW. For an additional 
citation on phenomenology versus ontology, see John Meyer, Reflections on Institutional Theory and 
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The analysis herein is motivated by sociological institutional theory, 
specifically its world society and organizational variants. World society theory 
proposes a structural, phenomenological explanation for the diffusion and 
replication of international models over time. In an increasingly integrated world, 
global models take myriad forms, including individual rights as the model form of 
social justice and the university as the exemplary form of higher education.6 
According to sociological institutionalism, global models are enacted at the 
national level because of their institutionalization in world society, not because of 
national needs or interests. Similarly, organizational institutionalism posits that, in 
response to decisional uncertainty, organizations mimic institutionalized models 
of their organizational field.7 In a field like the U.S. legal system, exogenous and 
endogenous models of appropriate behavior, rather than purposive rational action 
by individual judges, shape decision making.8 
By drawing on institutional theory, this Article develops how the two-
element approach to identifying CIL is an institutionalized model of world society 
that has structured action in the international legal system for the past century. 
Critical to this isomorphism was the international development of typified 
language relating to customary law’s two constitutive elements. To signal 
legitimacy within the international arena, organizations, including courts and 
arbitral tribunals, incorporate the legitimated methodology of the two-element 
approach. 
Along with its institutionalization at the international level, however, CIL is 
also subject to social definition and application at the national level. For centuries, 
questions regarding the existence and content of customary international rules 
have arisen in national courts in a variety of substantive areas, including on issues 
of immunity, international crimes, and human rights.9 National courts, which have 
their own institutionalized rules for resolving legal ambiguity, have thus been faced 
with an apparent institutional contradiction: is the appropriate institutionalized 
 
World Society, in WORLD SOCIETY: THE WRITINGS OF JOHN MEYER 36, 46–47 (Goerg Krucken & 
Gili Drori eds., 2009) [hereinafter WORLD SOCIETY]. 
6  See generally Patricia Bromley & John W. Meyer, Hyper-Organization: Global Organizational 
Expansion (2015).  
7  See generally John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and 
Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340 (1977) (describing organizational institutionalism). 
8  Id.; see also Lauren B. Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to 
Institutionalized Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. SOC. 888 (2011).  
9  See, for example, Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (using customary 
international law to identify the contours of personal inviolability, including widely recognized 
exceptions); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, 
and must be ascertained by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of 
right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”); cf. James Coleman, Social 
Theory, Social Research, and a Theory of Action, 91 AM. J. SOC. 1309, 1313 (1986) (“All case law is based 
inherently on a theory of action . . . based on the conception of purposive individuals with rights 
and interests, who are responsible for their actions.”). 
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model for identifying CIL located in the national or international realm? This 
Article examines how plural institutionalized models generate judicial uncertainty 
and variation in practice. 
To better understand the variation, this Article draws on a systematic content 
analysis of over three hundred U.S. federal court cases decided between 1945 and 
2015 in which the existence of a rule of CIL was in question. On the basis of those 
cases, the Article proposes a typology of identification approaches and examines 
how methodological variation has shifted over time. The three approaches—
developed herein as the “internationalist,” “voluntarist,” and “exceptionalist” 
approaches—reflect distinctive treatments of the internationalized model.10 The 
internationalist variant reflects adoption of the international method of rule 
identification; the voluntarist approach adapts the internationalized model to 
accommodate institutionalized decision-making logics of the U.S. legal system; 
and the exceptionalist approach rejects the international model in favor of a 
national approach.  
Using that typology, this Article seeks to develop a more nuanced 
understanding of how institutional pluralism shapes judicial decision-making and 
the evolution of international law in the U.S. courts. As the invocation of 
international norms in U.S. courts has increased since World War II, there has 
been a significant increase in judicial reference to the international method. Yet 
the prevailing approach has been the hybrid voluntarist model, which requires 
confirmation that U.S. practice adheres to the internationally derived rule. This 
pattern of hybridization has significant implications for the usage, content, and 
legitimacy of international law in U.S. courts, as well as the normative coherence 
of the international legal system. 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Section II introduces the sociological 
institutional theory that informs the analysis. Section III elaborates the consensus 
international approach to the identification question. Section IV considers how 
plural institutional methods have shaped the treatment of international law in U.S. 
courts. Lastly, Section V develops a typology of U.S. approaches to the 
identification question. 
 
10  At the outset, it is important to emphasize that this Article does not question the international 
consensus on customary international law. Even were it to be empirically established that there 
exists a distinctive U.S. judicial approach to the identification of customary rules—an inquiry that 
is beyond the scope of this Article—it is not suggested here that any such method would undermine 
the international consensus surrounding the “two-element” approach. To the contrary, this Article 
recognizes the discounted value that is traditionally accorded to judicial practice—as compared to 
executive or diplomatic practice—for the purpose of assessing state practice under customary 
international law. In this vein, it should be understood merely as an effort to unpack U.S. federal 
courts’ institutional approach to identification questions. 
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II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS AS INSTITUTIONALIZED 
MODELS OF WORLD SOCIETY 
Sociological institutionalism proposes that behavior is shaped by 
institutionalized models that take on a “rule-like status in social thought and 
action.”11 Such models operate at the cultural level and inform what is considered 
rational, legitimate, and normative. Unlike realist theories of action that emphasize 
how interests generate behavior—and view institutions as epiphenomenal of such 
behavior—neo-institutional theory proposes that action is structured by culturally 
constituted logics of appropriateness.12 As such logics diffuse, they become taken-
for-granted moral assumptions that are folded into the fabric of society and into 
the decisions of organizations and individuals. 
A core proposition of neo-institutional theory is that its explanatory power 
transcends societal levels. The influence of legitimated institutionalized models 
can be observed and tested across global, national, and local cultures. For example, 
the theory’s propositions have motivated studies on the extent of homogeneity 
across world culture, as well as across specialized organizational fields at the local 
level.13 While orthodox institutionalisms suggest that actors unconsciously and 
unknowingly enact models, variants of the theory have considered whether 
institutions instead constrain the range of thinkable alternatives. In other words, 
as it concerns the well-trodden dialectic between structure and agency, 
institutionalisms vary in their emphasis on structural influence, but their common 
conviction is that institutionalized environments shape what is all too often 
understood to be simply agentic, purposive behavior.14 
A. Neo-Institutional Theory’s World Society Variant 
Over the past half-century, neo-institutional scholarship has demonstrated 
how linkages to world society explain the diffusion of models of action across the 
globe. As the international community integrated following World War II, 
professionals working through and within international governmental and non-
governmental organizations developed models in a broad range of fields of global 
concern.15 Among other examples, the university became the model of higher 
education around the world, individual and human rights became the unified 
 
11  Meyer & Rowan, supra note 7, at 341. 
12  THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 29 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. 
DiMaggio eds., 1991) (describing the “central logic” of institutional orders as a “set of material 
practices and symbolic structures—which constitute its organizing principles . . .”) [hereinafter THE 
NEW INSTITUTIONALISM]. 
13  See generally WORLD SOCIETY: THE WRITINGS OF JOHN MEYER, supra note 5. 
14  Id. at 13. 
15  See generally Bromley & Meyer, supra note 6.  
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measure of social justice, and hyper-rationalized management displaced traditional 
bureaucracy as the optimal organizational form for progress. These international 
models were developed to homogenize and standardize expectations of behavior 
internationally and stabilize the world order.16 
While national adoption of global models is often styled as a functional 
solution to a pressing social problem, or as agentic processes of internalization or 
adoption,17 world society theory proposes that national enactment of international 
models is often more ceremonial than real. The ordered realism baked into 
national implementation is constructed and supported by rationalized myths of 
the global polity.18 Empirical studies have demonstrated that there is considerable 
disjunction between the ceremonial adoption of global models in areas such as 
human rights, environmentalism, education, and the on-the-ground practices of 
national governments.19 From the perspective of institutional theory, this 
decoupling is a necessary feature of global society, as it maintains universalistic 
notions of common rationality grounded in national sovereignty and individual 
actorhood.20 With time, however, the institutionalized models often penetrate 
local societies and become the rationalized model of behavior across 
organizational levels. 
B. Translation, Editing, and Organizational Analysis 
One way in which variation is theorized to occur is through institutional 
pluralism. Models are developed within particular societal sectors—such as world 
society, national legal systems, or professions—before interaction between sectors 
leads to friction and contestation.21 For organizations embedded within multiple 
normative orders with conflicting institutionalized logics, the taken-for-granted 
assumptions of one environment may conflict with those of another.22 Many 
international legal scholars understand this contestation as a process of 
replacement, whereby a dominant model takes the place of another model, 
typically through processes of persuasion or socialization.23 Yet, organizational 
 
16  Id. at 7.  
17  See, for example, Harold Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 203–05 (1996); see 
generally RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS 
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013). 
18  MEYER, supra note 5, at 46–49. 
19  Id. 
20  Id. at 51.  
21  THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 12, at 29 (describing institutions as shapers of interest and 
cultural frames on the international level; institutional contradictions arise when two institutions 
have to fit together at the micro level).  
22  Mary B. Dunn & Candace Jones, Institutional Logics and Institutional Pluralism: The Contestation 
of Care and Science Logics in Medical Education, 1967–2005, 55 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 114, 115 (2010).  
23  See, for example, Koh, supra note 17; GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 17. 
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institutionalism has developed how contestation may result in hybridization rather 
than replacement—pluralism may generate hybrid forms that seek legitimacy in 
multiple environments.24 
In the context of world society theory, Scandinavian institutionalism usefully 
explores two processes by which global models are adapted to local environments. 
The first is a process of “translation”—the diffused model remains largely intact 
but is not “passively transferred wholesale from one setting to another.”25 And 
the second is a process of “editing”—externally derived models are edited and 
actively reshaped by local participants.26 According to such accounts, individuals 
remain constructed by external sources and are not atomistic actors with a priori 
interests that determine behavior.27 
The upshot of the foregoing is that institutionalization of a global model, if 
it occurs, may be a haphazard, messy process that is not nearly as systematic or 
purposive as actor-centric theories suggest.28 In contrast to realist theories of 
interest-driven adoption and compliance, neo-institutional theory offers a more 
dynamic, nuanced alternative for understanding the reconciliation of institutional 
contradictions at national or local levels.29 What prevails will not necessarily be the 
model that most efficiently addresses local needs, nor the model that reflects 
instrumental interests, but instead the model that posits that organizational 
behavior is shaped by externally derived, plural, and often shifting conceptions of 
legitimacy30 within the organizational field.31 Indeed, as organizations face choices, 
they refer to exogenous models of legitimate behavior from those in comparable 
situations. And as models are adapted and diffused through an organizational 
field, the hybridized, plural logic comes to be presented in rationalistic terms. In 
the process, the hybrid model may ultimately come to be seen as the legitimate 
and rational model of behavior.32 
Because of its particular relevance to this Article, it is also worth noting how 
neo-institutional theory departs from old institutionalisms, including legal process 
 
24  Dunn & Jones, supra note 22. 
25  David F. Suárez & Patricia Bromley, Institutional Theories and Levels of Analysis: History, Diffusion, and 
Translation, in WORLD CULTURE RE-CONTEXTUALISED, 139, 145 (Jurgen Schriewer ed., 2018). 
26  Id. at 146. 
27  Id. 
28  Id. at 141 (“Overstressing the transformative role of domestic actors and specific contexts may lead 
to a naïve optimism about agency[,] but . . . a problem with the isomorphism thesis is its failure to 
grasp the processes and mechanisms which are typical of the always selective re-contextualization 
of global models, ideas, and policies.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
29  Id. at 141. 
30  Legitimacy here refers to a “generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate, within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, 
and definitions.” Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20 
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 574 (1995). 
31  THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 12, at 28–31 (citing Meyer & Rowan, supra note 7). 
32  Suárez & Bromley, supra note 25, at 146.  
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theories that inform contemporary international law scholarship.33 While there are 
several core differences, the salient one for this Article is that new institutionalisms 
move away from socialization theories that focus on normative persuasion and 
internalization as the basis for behavior.34 Instead, neo-institutionalism suggests 
that models inform organizational choices by structuring menus of legitimate and 
taken-for-granted rules of behavior.35 Rather than persuading actors of a model’s 
functional or moral appropriateness, institutional environments create the lenses 
through which actors view the world and understand categories of action and 
thought, rather than persuading purposive actors.36 Institutionalization remains 
iterative and interactive but is less purposive or normative than previously 
understood. 
III. THE INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO THE 
IDENTIFICATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
International law began as a set of customary rules that developed external 
to national legal fields. The law of nations—as international law was previously 
known—was comprised of supranational rules relating to international questions 
such as the navigation of the high seas and diplomatic relations. Until the relatively 
recent proliferation of treaties, most such rules were uncodified. In effect, they 
were institutionalized rules of the international community of nations—taken-for-
granted assumptions about appropriate behavior among nation states. 
Since World War II, many customary rules have been formalized in 
multilateral treaties, yet much of CIL remains unwritten. Faced with the attendant 
uncertainty of applying unwritten rules, the two main international courts of 
justice—the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ)—developed a guiding standard for identifying the existence and 
 
33  Harold Koh, Why do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2656–57 (1997) (“Social 
internalization occurs when a norm acquires so much public legitimacy that there is widespread 
general obedience to it. Political internalization occurs when political elites accept an international 
norm, and adopt it as a matter of government policy. Legal internalization occurs when an 
international norm is incorporated into the domestic legal system through executive action, judicial 
interpretation, legislative action, or some combination of the three.”) (emphasis added).  
34  The agentic socialization view is often found in the social-constructivist approach to international 
relations. On the process of international socialization and its socialization agents, see also Martha 
Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 
902 (1998); Vaughn P. Shannon, Norms are What States Make Them: The Political Psychology of Norm 
Violation, 44 INT’L STUD. Q. 293, 297 (2000); WESLEY L. GOULD & MICHAEL BARKUN, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 128–30 (1970); Martha Finnemore, International 
Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and 
Science Policy, 47 INT’L ORG. 565, 568–70 (1993); Anthony Arend, Do Legal Rules Matter? International 
Law and International Politics, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 107, 134 (1998). 
35  THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 12, at 15. 
36  Id. at 13.  
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content of such rules that has structured organizational practice within the 
international field for the past century.37 While the initial formulation of the 
international model was the product of conscious design, its taken-for-
grantedness in the international system has resulted from processes of legitimation 
and institutionalization. 
Critical to the method’s institutionalization has been the evolution of typified 
language of CIL relating to its two constitutive elements: (1) generalized state 
practice and (2) opinio juris (a sense of legal obligation). To signal legitimacy within 
the international arena, organizations, including courts and arbitral tribunals, 
incorporate this methodology to demonstrate that they are “acting on collectively 
valued purposes in a proper and adequate manner.”38 
A. The International Court of Justice 
The enumeration of the sources of international law in the Statute of the ICJ 
is considered authoritative within the international legal system. Among the 
sources identified is CIL: Article 38(1)(b) provides that the Court shall apply 
“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”39 This 
definition, which is identical to the one contained in Article 38(b) of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice,  reflects a longstanding understanding 
of CIL as consisting of an objective and subjective element.40 Within the 
decentralized international legal system, state practice (the objective element) in 
conformity with a sense of legal obligation (the subjective element) serves as 
evidence of state consent to the rule in question. 
ICJ jurisprudence has refined the two-element approach through regular 
invocation and elaboration.41 For the purposes of this Article, the Court’s nuanced 
deviations from the generalized model are less important than how the general 
approach to identification questions has become the taken-for-granted model in 
the international legal system. Indeed, a vast number of international courts and 
tribunals, including the international criminal tribunals, the World Trade 
 
37  League of Nations, Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 16 December 1920, Art. 
38(1)(b); United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946, Art. 38(1)(b). 
38  Meyer & Rowan, supra note 7, at 50.  
39  United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946, Art. 38(1)(b).  
40  The Spanish legal philosopher Francisco Suárez radically shifted the understanding of customary 
international law away from natural law principles and towards the subjective notion of legal 
obligation. See DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 139 (2010) (“Borrowing from 
canon law, Suárez indicated that ‘[c]ustom is a kind of law [ius] introduced by usages and accepted 
as law.”).  
41  See, for example, Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. 266 (November 20) (elaborating on 
the required elements of (1) uniform state practice that is (2) mutually accepted as law); Fisheries 
(U.K. v Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. 116 (December 18) (elaborating on two-element approach); 
Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 
14 (June 27) (indicating that state practice must only exhibit “general” conformity).  
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Organization’s dispute settlement bodies, and international arbitral tribunals, 
routinely and reflexively use the international model.42 As the International Law 
Commission (ILC) notes, “[n]otwithstanding the specific contexts in which these 
other courts and tribunals work, overall there is substantial reliance on the 
approach and case law of ICJ, including the constitutive role attributed to the two 
elements of State practice and opinio juris.”43 Existing jurisprudence leaves 
evidentiary questions open to debate, particularly as to the existence and content 
of particular rules, but the two-element approach has itself remained consistent, 
uniform, and accepted. 
B. The International Law Commission 
The ILC is an expert subsidiary body of the U.N. General Assembly with a 
mandate to codify and progressively develop international law.44 After several 
decades of focusing on the development of draft treaties, in 2012 the ILC turned 
its attention to the formation and evidence of CIL. Recognizing the important 
role that custom continues to play in international law, as well as the inherent 
difficulties of assessing the existence of such rules, the ILC set out to offer 
guidance to those not expert in international law on how to apply the international 
model.45 To do so, the Commission has drawn on state practice, the jurisprudence 
of international courts and tribunals, and its own prior work. 
In the early stages of its work, the ILC commissioned a study of its own 
historical approach to CIL.46 As the principal international institution with a 
mandate to codify existing rules of international law,47 the ILC has routinely 
considered, both explicitly and implicitly, the identification question. A 
comprehensive survey of the Commission’s rule identification conducted by the 
U.N. Secretariat, on topics ranging from the law of the sea to international 
criminal law, reaffirmed that the two-element approach had long ago become 
institutionalized in the ILC’s practice.48 
 
42  Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), First Rep. on Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law, 
U.N. Doc., A/CN.4/663, ¶¶ 66–85 (May 17, 2013). 
43  Int’l Law Comm’n, First Rep. on Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law, U.N. 
Doc. A.CN.4/663, ¶ 66 (2013). 
44  About the Commission, International Law Commission (July 31, 2017), http://perma.cc/965X-6SQ6. 
45 See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/68/10, ¶¶ 63–
107 (2013) (describing the ILC’s mandate to consider the topic). 
46  See generally, Int’l Law Comm’n, Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law: Elements 
in the Previous Work of the International Law Commission That Could Be Particularly Relevant to 
the Topic Int’l Law Comm’n, Memorandum by the Secretariat, at the Sixty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc 
A/CN.4/659 (2013) [hereinafter Memorandum by the Secretariat]. 
47  Int’l Law Comm’n, art. 15 (Nov. 21, 1947).  
48  Memorandum by the Secretariat, supra note 46, at 7.  
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As of the time of writing, the ILC has adopted sixteen draft conclusions on 
the two-element approach to the identification of CIL.49 The draft conclusions 
restate the two-element approach: “To determine the existence of a rule of CIL 
and its content, it is necessary to ascertain whether there is a general practice that 
is accepted as law (opinio juris).”50 
To ascertain whether there is a general practice of States, the ILC elaborates 
guidance on the “forms of practice,” “assessing a State’s practice,” and the 
generality of the practice. The form of State practice may include, but is not limited 
to, “diplomatic acts and correspondence; conduct in connection with resolutions 
adopted by an international organization or at an intergovernmental conference; 
conduct in connection with treaties; executive conduct, including operational 
conduct ‘on the ground’; legislative and administrative acts; and decisions of 
national courts.” 51 To assess a “State’s practice,” the ILC indicates that “[a]ccount 
is to be taken of all available practice of a particular State, which is to be assessed 
as a whole.”52 And to identify whether the “State practice” element is satisfied, the 
ILC borrowed from the ICJ to affirm that the “relevant practice must be general, 
meaning that it must be sufficiently widespread and representative, as well as 
consistent.”53 
The ILC also elaborates the so-called subjective element, namely that the 
State practice is “accepted as law.” The Commission explains, in Conclusion 9, 
that “accepted as law” means that “the practice in question must be undertaken 
with a sense of legal right or obligation”54 and “is to be distinguished from mere 
usage or habit.”55 The Commission also explains how such acceptance is 
evidenced by the conduct of States, and notes that evidence could include 
acquiescence or the “[f]ailure to react over time.”56 
To provide more fulsome guidance to those tasked with identification 
questions, the ILC also elaborates conclusions on the evidentiary value of 
international and national materials. In particular, the ILC provides scenarios in 
 
49  The conclusions were adopted on first reading by the ILC at its seventy-first session in 2016. The 
Commission will consider the conclusions on second reading at its seventy-third session in 2018. 
See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Seventy-First Session, U.N. Doc. A/71/10, at 76–
111 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 Report].  
50  Id. at 76, Conclusion 2 (“To determine the existence and content of a rule of customary international 
law, it is necessary to ascertain whether there is a general practice that is accepted as law (opinio 
juris).”). 
51  Id. at 77, Conclusion 6(2).  
52  Id. at 77, Conclusion 7(1). 
53  Id. at 77, Conclusion 8(1). 
54  Id. 
55  Id. at 77, Conclusion 9(2). 
56  Id. at 77, Conclusion 10(3).  
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which a treaty, or multiple treaties, may reflect a rule of CIL;57 explains the 
evidentiary value of international organization practice;58 and sets forth the role of 
“subsidiary means,” including decisions of international courts and tribunals59 and 
scholarly writings.60 
The notion of “subsidiary” in this context recognizes the ancillary role of 
such sources in clarifying or revealing the content or existence of the law, rather 
than serving themselves as a source of law.61 The most salient of such subsidiary 
means are the “[d]ecisions of international courts and tribunals, in particular of 
the [ICJ].”62 Because international judges are recognized experts in the field of 
international law, their decisions on questions of CIL may usefully clarify or reveal 
the existence or content of customary rules. Importantly, however, the ILC 
cautions that neither judicial pronouncements nor scholarly writings “freeze the 
development of the law; rules of CIL may have evolved since the date of a 
particular decision.”63 
Finally, the Commission concludes that “regard may be had, as appropriate, 
to decisions of national courts concerning the existence and content of rules of 
customary international law.”64 The inclusion of “as appropriate” serves to caution 
that judgments of international courts “are generally accorded more weight than 
those of national courts for the present purpose, since the former are likely to 
have greater expertise in international law and are less likely to reflect a particular 
 
57  Id. at 78, Conclusion 11 (“A rule set forth in a treaty may reflect a rule of customary international 
law if it is established that the treaty rule: (a) codified a rule of customary international law existing 
at the time when the treaty was concluded; (b) has led to the crystallization of a rule of customary 
international law that had started to emerge prior to the conclusion of the treaty; or (c) has given 
rise to a general practice that is accepted as law (opinio juris), thus generating a new rule of customary 
international law.”). 
58  Id. at 78, Conclusion 12 (explaining that, while a resolution adopted by an international organization 
or at an intergovernmental conference “cannot, of itself, create a rule of customary international 
law,” it may “provide evidence for establishing the existence and content of a rule of customary 
international law, or contribute to its development” or “may reflect a rule of customary international 
law if it is established that the provision corresponds to a general practice that is accepted as law 
(opinio juris)”). 
59  Id. at 78, Conclusion 13.  
60  Id. at 78, Conclusion 14; see also id. at 111, Conclusion 14, commentary ¶¶ 3, 5 (drawing on extant 
doctrine, including Paquete Habana, the ILC concluded that scholars may play a critical role in 
examining the development or existence of customary rules. The value of such teachings must be 
carefully assessed, however, to ensure that they seek to record the state of international law as it is 
(lex lata), rather than to advocate its development in a particular direction (lex ferenda), whether on 
the basis of a national or individual position. Similarly, the products of international expert bodies 
such as the International Law Association must be assessed “in light of the mandate and expertise 
of the body concerned, the care and objectivity with which it works on a particular issue, the support 
a particular output enjoys within the body and the reception of the output by States.”).  
61  Id. at 109, Conclusion 13, commentary ¶ 2. 
62  Id. at 78, Conclusion 13(1). 
63  Id. at 109–10, Conclusion 13, commentary ¶ 3.  
64  Id. at 109, Conclusion 13(2).  
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national perspective.”65 Further, the Commission noted that “national courts 
operate within a particular legal system, which may incorporate international law 
only in a particular way and to a limited extent.”66 
IV. INSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM AND  
METHODOLOGICAL LEGITIMACY 
The notion that there may be variation in how national courts incorporate 
international law is what animates the inquiry herein. Though CIL is an 
international construct, developed and refined within the international legal 
system, questions of CIL arise within national legal regimes across the world.67 
National courts are routinely faced with questions regarding the existence and 
content of CIL. Courts in the U.S. and elsewhere have thus been faced with a 
dilemma: is the appropriate method for identifying CIL located in the national or 
international realm? This dilemma is particularly acute where the international 
model conflicts with a national system’s prevailing institutional logics for resolving 
legal uncertainty. 
The very premise of the ILC’s project is this multiplicity of fora, which leads 
to inconsistent methodologies and applications of international law. Where a 
national judge misapplies the international approach to the identification question, 
the prevailing assumption at the international level is that the inconsistency is the 
product of ignorance or instrumentalism.68 The misuse or misapplication of 
customary law is attributed to a judge’s failure to know or follow the rules of the 
international legal regime,69 or its invocation is considered purposive, strategic 
behavior.70 
 
65  Id. at 110, Conclusion 13, commentary ¶ 7. 
66  Id. at 110–11, Conclusion 13, commentary ¶ 7.  
67  This Article proceeds from the premise that the international and domestic legal frameworks in 
which identification processes arise are regimes in both the legal and sociological/institutional 
sense.  
68  See, for example, Anthea Roberts, Comparative International Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating 
and Enforcing International Law, 60 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 57, 69 (2011) (describing judges applying 
customary international law as agents of international order or national interests); Elizabeth H. Boyle 
& John W. Meyer, Modern Law as a Secularized and Global Model: Implications for the Sociology of Law, 49 
SOZIALE WELT 213, 221 (1998) (“Legal decision-making not based on the system of universal 
principles is the target of much suspicion. So myths about the importance of universal ideals are 
maintained, despite the diversity of local social organizations and cultures.”).  
69  THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 12, at 28 (explaining certain institutional logics).  
70  Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by 
National Courts, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 241, 243 (2008); see also Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, 
National Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution of International Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 59, 65–68 (2009). 
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Drawing on neo-institutionalist theory,71 this Article examines whether there 
is a sociological account that better explains the variation in approaches to CIL in 
U.S. courts. This account proceeds from the assumption that U.S. federal judges, 
like other organizational actors, are constructed by their institutional 
environments.72 The framework of the U.S. federal judiciary is itself an 
institutional environment, replete with “rules of appropriateness” that have 
become taken-for-granted.73 Such rules are the institutionalized logics that drive 
efforts to attain legitimacy within the legal system.74 As such, where an 
identification question arises in U.S. courts, there is latent institutional friction 
between the international and national approaches to resolving legal ambiguity.75 
Plural institutional logics structure judges’ cognitive frames,76 which in turn shape 
how judges seek legitimacy.77 
A. Legitimacy in the International Legal System 
The identification of a customary rule of international law in national court 
implicates multiple institutional environments, along with their respective 
conceptions of legitimacy. Legitimacy, as used herein, refers to a “generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate, within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
 
71  The term “institution” is used herein to refer to “any regulative or cognitive feature of an 
organizational environment such as rules, laws, norms, and cognitive frames.” GOODMAN & JINKS, 
supra note 17, at 11. Neo-institutionalist theory distinguishes between the concepts of 
“organizations”—the formal apparatus—and “institutions”—the “regulative and cognitive features 
of the organizational environment such as rules or shared beliefs.” Id. at 16. 
72  THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 12, at 28 (“[I]nstitutional frameworks define the ends and 
shape the means by which interests are determined and pursued.”); id. at 14 (“By comparison, the 
neoinstitutionalist rejection of intentionality is founded on an alternative theory of individual action, 
which stresses the unreflective, routine, taken-for-granted nature of most human behavior and 
views interests and actors as themselves constituted by institutions.”).  
73  Id. at 10 (“Organization theorists prefer models not of choice but of taken-for-granted expectations, 
assuming that actors associate certain actions with certain situations by ‘rules of appropriateness’ 
absorbed through socialization, education, on-the-job learning, or acquiescence to convention.”) 
(internal quotations omitted).  
74  Id. 
75  See id. at 29 (explaining that, in organizational theory, one form of “institutional contradiction” is 
the way in which institutions fit together at the microlevel).  
76  See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way 
Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L. J. 83 (2002).  
77  See THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 12, at 13 (“Environments, in this view, are more subtle 
in their influence; rather than being coopted by organizations, they penetrate the organization, 
creating the lenses through which actors view the world and the very categories of structure, action, 
and thought.”); GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 17, at 11 (“Once socially defined institutional 
environments are in place, changes in organizational form are frequently driven more by 
considerations of legitimacy than by concern for rational adaptation or efficiency.”); cf. Lauren B. 
Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized Employment Structures, 117 
AM. J. SOC. 888 (2011). 
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definitions.”78 Legitimacy judgments thus inform the communally sanctioned 
sources of law, as well as the institutionalized procedures for identifying and 
applying the law.79 
International rules, including customary rules, draw their legitimacy from 
procedural fairness grounded in state consent, and substantive avoidance of 
conflict with jus cogens norms. The legitimate formation of rules in the international 
legal system involves a dialogical process amongst states and, at times, 
international organizations.80 This process of legitimation is decentralized and 
horizontal—states are understood to engage as equals in various rule-making fora, 
including courts and tribunals, to develop, contest, and reify norms. 
Indeed, customary international rules themselves arise from legitimating 
processes. The emergence of a general and consistent practice accepted as law 
reflects the institutionalization of a norm by a critical mass of states, the social 
actors of the world system. Where a norm has not been adopted or acquiesced to 
by a generality of states, it is considered illegitimate and inapplicable as an 
 
78 Suchman, supra note 30, at 574. Although this definition of legitimacy is drawn from institutional 
theory, it largely reconciles with more legal concepts of legitimacy that refer to the procedural and 
substantive fairness of a norm, as informed by community perceptions and values. See DEVIKA 
HOVELL, THE POWER OF PROCESS: THE VALUE OF DUE PROCESS IN SECURITY COUNCIL 
SANCTIONS DECISION-MAKING 62 (2016) (“[T]he concept of legitimacy envisages a connection 
between the decision-making authority and community values sufficient to ground acceptance of 
that authority in the relevant community.”); Andrew J. Loomis, Leveraging Legitimacy in Securing 
U.S. Leadership 50 (Aug. 4, 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University) (on file 
with author), http://perma.cc/427V-ZHSU (“Legitimacy is premised on underlying legal and 
societal norms that form its substantive content. The legitimacy of a principle is merely a signal that 
the principle enjoys either widespread or deep acceptance . . . [the standards of legitimacy] are 
subjected to the dynamics of power relations in which legal norms and societal standards are 
contested.”).  
79  THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24 (1990) (defining legitimacy 
in the international law context as “a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts 
a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the 
rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles 
of right process”); LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 51 (1995) (“To 
acknowledge this fact is not to concede that legitimacy loses its pro-social content, but rather allows 
one to simultaneously access its characteristics . . . while confronting the reality that legitimacy is 
not the divine providence of kings and saints. Rather, legitimacy standards are the product of 
advocates, academic, practitioners and pundits, all contributing to shift the terms of what is 
acceptable in the eyes of the greater public.”). 
80  John G. Ruggie, American Exceptionalism and Global Governance: A Tale of Two Worlds? (Harv. U., John 
F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Working Paper No. 5, 2006), http://perma.cc/47NN-S2PL 
(“Legitimacy emerges out of a dialogical process of persuasion.”); RODNEY BARKER, LEGITIMATING 
IDENTITIES: THE SELF-PRESENTATIONS OF RULERS AND SUBJECTS 28 (2001) (noting that the 
process of legitimation is “an active, contested political process, rather than legitimacy as an abstract 
political resource”).  
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international rule of law.81 The international legal order, as a self-regulating system, 
thus relies on processes of legitimation and institutionalization for stability. 
B. Legitimacy in the U.S. Legal System 
The U.S. legal system consists of a largely self-contained set of rules and 
values, backstopped by the Constitution. And the federal judiciary, in turn, derives 
its institutional models from the cultural processes of the U.S. legal system.82 The 
relevant sources of law are typically the Constitution and statutes,83 and, far less 
often, foreign or international law. Where U.S. law applies, there is an implicit 
understanding that legitimacy stems from democratic processes or the 
Constitution. Where foreign law applies, legitimacy is the result of mutual 
agreement by the parties to the dispute.84 And where international law applies, its 
legitimacy derives from its incorporation by reference into the Constitution or a 
U.S. statute.85 
Once the communally sanctioned source of law has been identified, its 
legitimate application by U.S. federal judges is assessed in light of the concept of 
due process, as well as other institutionalized models of decision-making.86 
 
81  THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 26 (1995) (describing 
how fairness in the international legal system is evaluated by “reference to a community’s evolving 
standards”); see generally Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion, and History, 34 L. & 
SOC’Y REV. 157 (2000) (stating that customary international law serves to ensure that states act in a 
way that is considered pro-social). 
82  Boyle & Meyer, supra note 68, at 214–15; MEYER, supra note 13, at 350 (“Modern sovereignty seems 
to call, not so much for organizational domination, as for the legalized penetration of standardized 
rules.”). 
83  Federal law usually applies in U.S. federal courts, except for diversity jurisdiction cases where state 
law may apply.   
84  Matthew J. Wilson, Demystifying the Determination of Foreign Law in U.S. Courts: Opening the Door to a 
Greater Global Understanding, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887, 890 (2011) (“U.S. courts commonly 
encounter claims and issues that are governed by the laws of another sovereign either by virtue of 
mutual agreement or choice-of-law rules. Although many courts employing modern choice-of-law 
rules tend to favor the selection of their own forum’s law, they continue to apply foreign law to 
resolve conflicts arising out of contractual relationships, tortious conduct, employment matters, 
intellectual property rights, treaties, and domestic statutes incorporating foreign law, as well as other 
legal foundations.”). 
85  See generally JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1996); Paquete 
Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. 
86  Due process of law is a process that:  
following the forms of law, is appropriate to the case and just to the parties to 
be affected. It must be pursued in the ordinary mode prescribed by the law; it 
must be adapted to the end to be attained; and whenever it is necessary for the 
protection of the parties, it must give them an opportunity to be heard 
respecting the justice of the judgment sought. 
 Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884); see also Devika Hovell, Due Process in 
the United Nations, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2016) (“It is often said, and history confirms, that the 
essential aim of due process is to enhance the legitimacy of decisions.”); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, 
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Scholars and judges have developed decisional heuristics and rationalized 
organizing principles—referred to as legal doctrines—that seek to uphold fair 
process. Stare decisis—the doctrine of precedent that provides that “cases must 
be decided the same way when their material facts are the same”87—is the most 
notable, yet doctrines of abstention,88 deference,89 logic, and interpretation,90 as 
well as rules of procedure and evidence in adversarial litigation, also shape 
decisions. Despite their rationalized origins, such rules and doctrines have long 
since faded into the cognitive background of U.S. courts and become taken-for-
granted routines.  In effect, the rules and doctrines have become institutionalized 
models that are reflexively invoked to seek legitimacy within the U.S. legal system 
and promote trust and confidence in courts’ decisions.91 
While such doctrines are explicit and well understood, less prominent 
cognitive frames also deserve mention. Law and society scholarship, for example, 
has developed how social context structures a judge’s conception of fairness and 
justice. This context includes the social influences on judges’ decision-making, 
such as political preferences92 and “peer effects,”93 as well as ideological or 
 
CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 108 (1997); CAROL 
HARLOW & RICHARD RAWLINGS, LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 621 (3d ed. 2009).  
87  GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, LEARNING THE LAW 67–68 (9th ed. 1973). 
88  See, for example, Jaber v. United States, 155 F. Supp. 3d 70, 77–81 (D.D.C. 2016) (finding that 
whether government military strikes violated international law presents a non-justiciable political 
question); Konowaloff v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 702 F.3d 140, 146 (2d Cir. 2012) (abstaining 
from evaluating takings claim under customary international law as a result of the act of state 
doctrine); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). 
[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within 
its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized by 
this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous 
agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges 
that the taking violates customary international law.  
  (internal parentheses omitted). 
89  See, for example, Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 630 (7th Cir. 2004) (deferring to determination by the 
Executive Branch regarding sovereign immunity under international law). In addition, doctrines of 
deference include deference to higher court decisions, administrative court decisions, and the 
determinations of fact by trial courts.  
90  There are myriad doctrines of constitutional and statutory interpretation that seek to order and 
standardize the application of law in federal cases. See generally FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2009). 
91  Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman, Introduction, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW 
INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 3 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999); Boyle & 
Meyer, supra note 68, at 226 (“Inconsistency [in national legal systems] is seen as irrational, and 
extreme efforts are made to rule it out . . . in common law systems with elaborate structures of 
hierarchical courts.”); Daniel M. Katz & Derek K. Stafford, Hustle and Flow: A Social Network Analysis 
of the American Federal Judiciary, 71 OHIO ST. L. J. 457, 505–06 (2010).  
92  Judicial behavioralists and attitudinalists have long theorized the linkages between political ideology 
and judicial decision-making. See, for example, JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993); THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 
(Nancy Maveety ed., 2003). 
93  Katz & Stafford, supra note 91, at 460, 464, 474, 505, 506.  
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institutional traditions, such as consistency. Indeed, organizational theories have 
long described the process by which social processes become taken-for-granted 
in various domains of work activity.94 The “juridical field, like any social field, is 
organized around a body of internal protocols and assumptions, characteristic 
behaviors and self-sustaining values.”95 As a result, its values, internal protocols, 
and assumptions develop into habitual patterns of behavior that structure judges’ 
decision-making.96 
C. Institutional Pluralism in U.S. Courts 
The upshot of the foregoing is that identification questions in U.S. courts 
implicate multiple institutional environments with conflicting conceptions of how 
to legitimately resolve legal ambiguity. This pluralism implicates not only 
substantive and procedural legal questions, but also social tension and cognitive 
frames. Judges immersed in an identification exercise may variously—and 
unknowingly—seek to comply with the legitimating scripts of their judicial circuit, 
the federal judiciary writ large, and the international legal system.97 Indeed, the 
proposition examined herein is whether the variation in approaches to the 
identification of CIL can be explained, in part, by the competing and evolving 
institutional imperatives at play.98 
It is important to recall in this context that the Supreme Court itself has 
sanctioned the use of CIL in certain U.S. cases. In 1900, the Supreme Court 
famously pronounced that 
[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and 
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as 
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their 
determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling 
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the 
 
94  Meyer & Rowan, supra note 7; Paul J. DiMaggio, The Iron Cage Revisited, in THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 12, at 42.  
95  Richard Terdiman, Translator’s Introduction to Pierre Bourdieu’s The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the 
Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L. J. 805, 806 (1987).  
96  Id. at 811. 
97  GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 17, at 5 (“[A]ll actors at any given moment occupy multiple roles, 
identify with multiple reference groups, pursue multiple partially incompatible purposes, and enact 
multiple highly legitimated scripts for social action.”); WORLD SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 336 
(“Inconsistent rules provide counter-evidence to the idea that legal systems are based on universal 
principles and thus represent a serious threat to legitimacy.”); PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN 
ADMINISTRATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 17 (1957) (illuminating how formal 
organizations are “over time, infused with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at 
hand”).  
98  See KITTY CALAVITA, INVITATION TO LAW & SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF REAL 
LAW 11 (2010) (“The idea that different types of society produce, or at least coincide with different 
types of law is a foundational element of the law and society framework but is at odds with 
commonly held notions of law’s transcendence.”).  
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customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the 
works of jurists and commentators who by years of labor, research, and 
experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects 
of which they treat.99 
While this rendered the identification and application of CIL legitimate in U.S. 
courts, the Supreme Court’s dictum also acknowledged how difficult customary 
rules are to identify and proposed its own methodology for doing so. Indeed, 
federal courts over the years have routinely lamented the complexity of 
identification questions. More recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit recognized that, as CIL “does not stem from any single, definitive, readily-
identifiable source,” “the relevant evidence . . . is widely dispersed and generally 
unfamiliar to lawyers and judges.”100 As such, when confronted with issues as 
wide-ranging as piracy, counterfeiting, or expropriation, federal courts are tasked 
with resolving considerable ambiguity. 
As noted previously, to identify the existence and content of CIL, there is 
no definitive source to consult, unlike for questions of U.S. statutory law or 
international treaty law. Further, unlike questions of U.S. common law, prior 
decisions of U.S. courts on the same or similar questions are neither decisive nor 
persuasive—at least according to the international method—as CIL is a fluid 
construction that requires a contemporaneous evaluation of international practice. 
A prior higher or peer court decision, even if internationally compliant at the time 
of its issuance, thus does not properly identify CIL, as it does not account for any 
intervening changes in state behavior on the international level. Yet, as deep-
seated institutionalized logics of the U.S. legal system often generate deference to 
such prior decisions, uncertainty arises as to the appropriate identification 
procedure to follow, and courts resolve the uncertainty in varying ways. 
V. TYPOLOGY OF APPROACHES AMONG U.S. COURTS 
The sociological concept of decoupling describes the disconnect that may 
exist between a state’s professed policy and its actual practice “on the ground.”101 
In regards to the international legal system, the lack of effective, centralized 
compliance mechanisms produces myriad decoupling questions.102 For so-called 
“conventional” international law—treaties and other international agreements—
decoupling is largely a question of national implementation. To assess decoupling 
 
99  Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.  
100  Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 247–48 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Inst. of Cetacean 
Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, 860 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1229–30 (W.D. Wash. 2012) 
rev’d, 708 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2013), and rev’d, 725 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Complicating a court’s 
consideration . . . is the difficulty of ascertaining norms of customary international law.”). 
101  See, for example, GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 17, at 43; John W. Meyer et al., World Society and the 
Nation-State, 103 AM. J. SOC. 144, 154–56 (1997).  
102  Boyle & Meyer, supra note 68, at 332 (“Nation-states, because of their ostensible link to universal 
principles, also produce extreme decoupling of the law from practical social life.”).  
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requires an examination of any disconnect between national incorporation of the 
international rule and its implementation. 
For CIL, by contrast, the decoupling assessment contains a predicate 
methodological question. As the rules by nature are not necessarily codified, 
variations in identification methodology beget variations in substantive law. 
Where national judicial methods conflict with international methods, the rules of 
conduct identified may also diverge, undermining the coherence of CIL. Indeed, 
as developed by neo-institutional theory, decoupling is particularly acute where 
rationalized organizational interests conflict with extra-organizational legal 
requirements.103 This divergence animates the ILC’s work described in Section III, 
as well as the analysis herein. 
This analysis differs from the ILC’s work, however, in its foundational 
assumptions about the source of variation. Unlike positivist and legal process 
theories of national divergence, this Article proposes that variation flows from 
institutional rather than motivational pluralism. It queries whether the variation 
arises from overlapping, institutionalized models of the international and national 
legal systems, rather than individual-level attitudes or understandings as to the 
international method of identification. 
A. Data and Methods 
To test this proposition, the analysis herein considers how identification 
methods in U.S. federal courts co-vary with U.S. linkages to world society. The 
dependent variable of interest is a typology of approaches U.S. federal courts have 
taken to identify rules of CIL. The variable was constructed on the basis of a 
systematic review of 327 cases between 1945 and 2015 in which the U.S. federal 
courts identified or determined the existence of a rule of CIL.104 From those 327 
cases, 410 identification exercises—some cases had more than one customary rule 
in question—were qualitatively assigned to one of three typology categories. 
The typology’s three categories each reflect a distinctive method of resolving 
the legal ambiguity presented by identification questions. The first two—
described herein as the internationalist and voluntarist approaches—reflect 
variants of the prevailing international model. The internationalist approach 
reflects complete or near-complete deference to the prevailing international 
approach—the assessment of the identification question simulates the analysis 
and logics of an international actor operating in the international community as 
developed by the ILC. The voluntarist approach, by contrast, translates the 
international approach. It employs the international model but gives weighted 
regard to U.S. acceptance of the norm in question. The third variant, the 
 
103  Id.; WORLD SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 333.  
104  The qualitative coding was conducted using MaxQDA software. All coded documents are on file 
with the author and are available upon request.  
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exceptionalist approach, rejects the internationalist approach and relies primarily 
on U.S. foreign relations law. 
The independent variable of interest is the total number of U.S. treaties and 
executive agreements in force by year. The annual number of treaties and 
agreements in force is used as a proxy for the strength of the U.S.’ linkages to 
world society.105 This independent variable enabled a regression analysis of how 
variation in identification approaches has changed as U.S. linkages to world society 
have increased over time. Control variables were also included in the analysis to 
see if the variation in identification approaches was influenced by the court’s 
Judicial Circuit, the judge’s appointing party (or the majority party in the case of 
panels), or the type of case.106 
B. Sampling Frame and Biases 
Before delving into the statistical analysis, it is important to note a few issues 
relating to methodology. As with any empirical legal research project, 
methodological decisions were made at the outset. The most fundamental of those 
decisions related to the sampling frame, namely the sample of judicial decisions 
that would be analyzed. For the purposes of this project, an approach known as 
“universal sampling” best served the analysis. Because of the small number of U.S. 
cases that engage with questions of identification, it was possible to forego 
random or quota sampling. While such methods are used often in the social 
sciences, they are necessary only when the total population to be observed is large 
and unmanageable. I used the Westlaw database to isolate the available U.S. 
federal court cases that seek to identify a rule of CIL. It bears mentioning here 
that an overwhelming majority of case-coding projects use this universal sampling 
method. 
With the sampling method decided, the next key methodological question 
related to bias. To begin with, the use of the Westlaw database inherently 
introduces bias as only select federal court decisions are included. This selection 
bias occurs in two stages. First, West includes decisions that are published in the 
Federal Supplement. Decisions are published in the Federal Supplement only if they are 
“of interest” to the general membership of the Federal bar or advance 
understanding of an area of law. Second, other considerations influence the 
decisions that get published. For example, all the substantive opinions of certain 
notable federal district courts, such as the Southern District of New York and the 
 
105  See Jeong-Woo Koo & Francisco O. Ramirez, National Incorporation of Global Human Rights: Worldwide 
Expansion of National Human Rights Institutions, 1966–2004, 87 SOC. FORCES 1321, 1334 (2009) (using 
international human rights treaty ratifications as a proxy for the strength of a state’s linkage to world 
society). The data on treaties and executive agreements in force was kindly provided by Julian 
Nyarko.  
106  In appellate and Supreme Court cases, the appointing party of the majority of judges is used.  
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Northern District of Illinois, are included in the Westlaw database. Individual 
federal judges may also submit particular decisions for consideration by West 
editors, though short memorandum decisions, orders, and other routine issuances 
are excluded.107 
My content analysis includes only those cases that have been selected for 
publication in the Westlaw database and, therefore, does not pull from the total 
universe of U.S. federal court cases. This methodological choice necessarily 
introduces selection bias. The bias, however, should not affect the generalized 
institutional trends observed in this Article. It should be the case that trends 
observed in the analyzed sample are reflective of substantive trends in all U.S. 
federal cases on this issue. 
It is possible that generalized trends related to the identification question—
for example, summary dismissal of cases involving CIL—are not captured in the 
sample examined. This unavoidably introduces some bias. While selection bias is 
necessarily a limitation of this study—as it is in all empirical studies—based on 
the nature of the analysis and of West’s selection criteria, it is unlikely that the 
excluded cases would alter the results. Cases that conform to the approaches 
examined below may well have been excluded, but their exclusion would only 
affect the intensity of the variation described below. Moreover, it is highly unlikely 
that cases that substantively engaged with CIL and departed from the approaches 
described below would not have been included in the database.108 In other words, 
the differences between the studied and omitted cases are likely trivial.109 
C. Results and Discussion 
The findings of the qualitative content analysis demonstrate that U.S. 
integration into the international community is associated with a statistically 
significant increase in the number of U.S. federal court cases that seek to identify 
the content or existence of CIL. Consistent with the world society hypothesis, as 
the number of U.S. treaties in force grew substantially over the latter half the 
twenty-first century, there was a significant increase in the number of 
identification exercises in U.S. courts. For example, while between 1945 and 1955 
there were only seventeen such cases identified on Westlaw, between 1995 and 
2005 there were more than a hundred. 
 
107  See Ellen Platt, Unpublished vs. Unreported: What’s the Difference?, 5 PERSPECTIVES: TEACHING LEGAL 
RESEARCH AND WRITING 26, 27 (1996). 
108  Id. at 27 (explaining that West Publishing’s criteria for selecting cases includes decisions that 
question or establish rules of law).  
109  See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 
63, 105 (2008) (explaining why selection bias is a necessary, though trivial, aspect of content analyses 
relying on judicial databases). 
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This increase in the number of identification exercises, at least to the 
sophisticated international law observer, is likely unsurprising. The increased 
invocation of CIL, on its own, however, does not shed light on whether its usage 
reflects ceremonial or formal adherence to the international approach. This 
decoupling question, for the reasons discussed above, is a critical dimension of 
CIL, which relies on a fluid, internationalized method of inquiry. 
To unpack the decoupling question, further analysis of how the content of 
international rules were identified by U.S. courts is required. As can be seen from 
Figure 2 below, the cases revealed that, despite a dramatic increase in identification 
exercises, important methodological variation persists to this day. While 
integration into world society is associated with an increased likelihood of resort 
to the internationalist method,110 identification approaches that stress U.S. consent 
to the international rule remain the dominant model of identification. 111 
 
110  Ordinary least squares and multinomial logistic regression models were used. See Appendices 1 and 
2. For each additional unit of increase in U.S. integration into world society, a U.S. court was more 
likely to resort to the internationalist method (as compared to the exceptionalist method). See 
Appendix 2 for the full table of results. 
111  The first model (in Appendix 1) indicates that for each additional unit increase in U.S. integration 
into world society over time (as measured by U.S. treaties in force by year), a U.S. court was 
significantly more likely to require U.S. consent. The p-value is .034—the chance that one would 
get similar results by chance—and below the statistical significance level of .05 used for this study.  
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Figure 2 reflects that, despite the U.S. integrating into world society, and 
despite the institutionalization of the internationalist method of identification at 
the international level (see, supra, Section III), U.S. courts have become 
increasingly likely to require U.S. consent as an element of determining the 
existence or content of a customary rule of international law. In other words, in 
contrast to the two-element approach, the dominant U.S. approach includes a 
third element. This pattern holds even when controlling for the type of case, the 
appointing party of the deciding judge(s), and the federal judicial circuit. 
The consent element, while critical, still does not tell the full story. The 
content analysis also revealed that there is variation among the identification 
exercises requiring U.S. consent. In cases employing the “voluntarist” approach, 
consent was used as a confirmatory element to supplement the international 
method of identification. After using international sources and methods to review 
whether there was a general practice among states that accepted a customary rule 
as law, the courts in question rely on the consent element as a complementary step 
to identifying the rule. By contrast, other courts—those employing the 
“exceptionalist” approach—rely exclusively on U.S. practice or consent to 
determine the existence of the international rule. 
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Indeed, for a plurality of U.S. courts, there has been an increasing likelihood 
of resort to what is, in effect, a hybrid identification method. Rather than simple 
adherence to an international or national method of identification, the analysis 
revealed that many courts employ a method that appears to seek legitimacy in both 
the international and national legal systems. 
1. The Internationalist Approach 
The internationalist approach refers to the use of the internationally 
legitimated model to assess the existence of rules of CIL. Courts exhibiting the 
internationalist approach review relevant international materials, specifically state 
practice as manifested in treaties, conventions, and treatises, to examine the 
evidence of the objective and subjective elements of CIL. The institutional friction 
is resolved by deferral to the expectations and interpretations of the legal 
personalities and rule-makers of international law, namely the states and 
organizations of the international community.112 This analysis, in essence, tracks 
 
112  See Matthew S. Kraatz & Emily S. Block, Organizational Implications of Institutional Pluralism, in THE 
SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL INSTITUTIONALISM 243, 255 (Royston Greenwood et al. 
eds., 2008) (discussing how organizations resolve disparate institutional environments).  
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the international method and seeks to ascertain whether international evidence 
exists to satisfy the identification burden.113 
  
 
113  See, for example, United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 632–33 (E.D. Va. 2010) (engaging in a 
systematic review of “relevant sources of evidence of customary international law,” including 
international treaties, to determine the international law of piracy); Krishanthi v. Rajaratnam, No. 
09-CV-05395, 2010 WL 3429529, at *8–11 (D.N.J. Aug. 26, 2010) (reviewing the statutes of several 
international courts and tribunals to identify the definition of crimes against humanity under 
international law).  
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International here denotes a broad, geographically representative 
examination of state practice to examine the objective and subjective elements of 
CIL. As articulated by the Second Circuit, this approach “look[s] primarily to the 
formal lawmaking and official actions of States and only secondarily to the works 
of scholars as evidence of the established practice of States.”114 Depending on the 
case and substantive area in question, the reliance on international materials may 
include international treaties and conventions,115 international organization 
 
114  United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 103 (2d Cir. 2003).  
115  See, for example, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 377, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“In 
determining the existence of a customary international law norm, ‘agreements that are not self-
executing or that have not been executed by federal legislation . . . are appropriately considered 
evidence of the current state of customary international law.’”) (quoting Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 
562 F.3d 163, 176 (2d Cir. 2009)); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 256 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(“Treaties, which sometimes are entitled ‘conventions’ or ‘covenants,’ are proper evidence of 
customary international law because, and insofar as, they create legal obligations akin to contractual 
obligations on the States parties to them.”) (emphasis in original); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co., 621 F.3d 111, 137 (2d Cir. 2010) 
Although all treaties ratified by more than one State provide some evidence of 
the custom and practice of nations, “a treaty will only constitute sufficient proof of 
a norm of customary international law if an overwhelming majority of States have 
ratified the treaty, and those States uniformly and consistently act in accordance 
with its principles.” 
  (quoting Flores, 414 F.3d at 256) (emphasis in original); Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 
257, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) 
[T]reaties, also referred to as conventions or covenants, that create legal 
obligations on the States party to them, constitute primary evidence of the law 
of nations. A state’s ratification of a treaty is evidence of its intent to be legally 
obligated by the principles embodied in the treaty and therefore evidences the 
‘customs and practices’ of that State. 
  (quoting Flores, 414 F.3d at 256); Doe v. Rafael Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1154 (E.D. Cal. 2004) 
(“The international prohibition of crimes against humanity is explicitly codified in several 
multilateral agreements and has been extensively litigated in international tribunals. . . .”); M.C. v. 
Bianchi, 782 F. Supp. 2d 127, 131 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (observing that the Optional Protocol on the 
Rights of the Child, Sale of Children and Child Pornography has gained “widespread acceptance,” 
with particular mention of the U.S. and Moldova, the nations of the parties to the case, as 
signatories); Viera v. Eli Lilly, No. 1:09-cv-0495-RLY-DML, 2010 WL 3893791, at *3 (S.D. Ind. 
Sept. 30, 2010) (referring to Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, the Prevention of Major 
Industrial Accidents Convention of the ILO, and another declaration as “aspirational conventions” 
and thus not supportive of customary rule); Jama v. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 362 (D.N.J. 1998) 
(observing that “[a] number of international instruments prescribe [sic] cruel, unhuman or 
degrading treatment,” and citing the European Convention on Human Rights in particular).  
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practice,116 as well as international court decisions,117 domestic court decisions,118 
and writings of scholars and jurists.119 The reliance may also be direct or indirect, 
 
116  See, for example, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 888–92 (2d Cir. 
1981) (considering U.N. General Assembly resolutions as evidence of state practice regarding the 
expropriation compensation standard under customary international law); Presbyterian Church of 
Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 331, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (considering state 
practice with respect to international corporate liability); Almog v. Arab Bank, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257 
(relying on treaties and other sources as evidence of state practice regarding principle of distinction); 
Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702, 723 (D. Md. 2010) (citing various sources to find a 
“global consensus” that torture is not permitted during wartime). 
117  See, for example, Rafael Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 1155 (citing decisions by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
affirming the status of crimes against humanity under international law); Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 
2d 1258, 1331 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citing the statutes of ICTY and ICTR applying the commander 
responsibility doctrine, as well as ICTR cases identifying that doctrine as a “principle of customary 
international law”); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1181 (C.D. Cal. 
2005) (“[The ICTY and ICTR] recognize claims for cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. 
Numerous federal courts have recognized that customary international law prohibits cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment. Due to their enforcement in the international criminal tribunals, the Court 
holds that there is a customary international law norm. . . .”); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. 
Supp. 2d 424, 440 (D.N.J. 1999) (collecting cases and concluding that “the Nuremberg Tribunals 
held that the enslavement and deportation of civilian populations during WWII constitutes a crime 
against humanity . . . [and] courts have repeatedly held that ‘deportation to slave labor’ violates the 
law of nations”); Shan v. China Constr. Bank Corp., No. 09 Civ. 8566, 2010 WL 2595095, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2010) (citing the ICTY and Rome Statutes for standard of liability under 
international law); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506, 2007 WL 2349343, at *3–4 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 14, 2007) (citing ICTR and ICTY cases to define concepts of “widespread” and “civilian 
population” for purposes of identifying crimes against humanity).  
118  See, for example, Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 626–30 (reviewing U.S. Supreme Court cases that 
incorporated definitions of piracy under the law of nations into U.S. law).  
119  See, for example, Yousef, 327 F.3d at 101 (observing that: “publicists’ writings are not true ‘sources’ of 
international law,” but rather:  
an acceptable additional source to shed light on a particular question of 
international law only when “recourse must also be had” beyond the “opinions,” 
“decisions,” and “acts” of States, and only then “to a lesser degree” than to 
more authoritative evidence, such as the State’s own “declarations,” “laws,” and 
“instructions” to its agents.  
  (quoting CLIVE PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1965)); 
McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 116 F. Supp. 2d 13, 45–46 (D.D.C. 2000) (declining 
to draw a customary rule from the writings of one commentator where “international tribunals and 
commentators have repeatedly expressed a contrary conception of the law”); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 
886 F. Supp. 162, 185 (D. Mass. 1995) (citing an affidavit signed by twenty-seven international law 
scholars regarding international agreements that recognize certain human rights); Doe v. Adhikari 
v. Daoud & Partners, 697 F. Supp. 2d 674, 687 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (relying in part on an affidavit from 
professor “describ[ing] the overwhelming consensus regarding the status of forced labor and 
trafficking as international crimes”); Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 636–37.  
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as in some cases where courts rely on international sources of evidence cited by 
other U.S. courts120 or international legal experts.121 
While adopting the international approach to identify an international rule 
may appear self-evident, the internationalist approach reflects fundamental, and 
at times contested, assumptions about the nature and legitimacy of international 
law, the institutional character of the international legal system, and its operation 
in U.S. courts. By resorting primarily to international sources of evidence, courts 
take for granted that the identification exercise is grounded firmly in the consensus 
norms of the international community.122 Importantly, courts often recognize the 
primary importance of international sources of evidence irrespective of whether 
the U.S. has adopted a given norm in its own practice.123 As articulated by the 
court in United States v. Hasan: 
The fact that the United States has not signed or ratified [the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)] does not change the 
conclusion reached above regarding its binding nature. While the United 
States’ failure to sign or ratify UNCLOS does bar the application of UNCLOS 
as treaty law against the United States, it is not dispositive of the question of 
whether UNCLOS constitutes customary international law, because such a 
determination relies not only on the practices and customs of the United 
States, but instead of the entire international community.124 
Indeed, as noted above, the Hasan court’s approach to identifying the 
definition of piracy under CIL comprised a systematic review of international 
treaties and the judicial decisions of multiple countries, including the U.K., Kenya, 
and the U.S., as well as scholarly writings. 
For courts following the international method, the decoupling is often 
inverted. They will cite the Supreme Court’s recitation of the international model 
to legitimize their behavior in the national environment, but actually employ 
international sources and methods, rather than U.S. precedent or methods, to 
ascertain the law.125 Courts that transpose the international model but tweak it to 
 
120  See, for example, Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (citing Filartiga v. 
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880–84 (2d Cir. 1980) (for its analysis of international sources on torture); 
Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 795–798 (D. Kan. 1980) (for its analysis of 
international sources on arbitrary detention); Shan, 2010 WL 2595095, at *4–7 (citing Talisman 
Energy, 582 F.3d 244) (for its reliance on decisions of international courts and tribunals).  
121  See, for example, Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 903 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Tachiona ex rel. 
Tachiona v. Mugabe, 186 F. Supp. 2d 383, 389 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  
122  See, for example, Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1541 (concluding that case law demonstrates a “consensus to 
evince a customary international human rights norm”).   
123  See, for example, Rodriguez-Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 798 (“[E]ven though the indeterminate detention 
of an excluded alien cannot be said to violate the United States Constitution or our statutory laws, 
it is judicially remedial as a violation of international law” because sources of customary 
international law “clearly demonstrate[ ] that arbitrary detention is prohibited.”).  
124  747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 634 (E.D. Va. 2010) (emphasis in original).  
125  Boyle & Meyer, supra note 68, at 225–27 (describing the phenomenon of decoupling in national 
courts, where “rule systems are legitimated by their linkage to universal justice”). 
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make it conform to U.S. context may exhibit what scholars have described as 
“local rationality within the context of global institutionalism.”126 
It is important to emphasize that the internationalist approach does not 
imply exclusively international sources. Indeed, it often includes consideration of 
U.S. practice and adherence to the international norm.127 In New Jersey v. Delaware, 
for example, the Supreme Court looked primarily to the practice of foreign states, 
as reflected in treatises, to ascertain the existence of an international rule on 
boundary demarcation in rivers, but also looked to the practice of U.S. states on 
the issue.128 Similarly, in United States v. Flores, the Court relied in part on evidence 
of foreign state practice, as elaborated in relevant treatises, to find the existence 
of an international rule enabling states to assert jurisdiction over foreign vessels 
disturbing the peace of ports, but also pointed to the invocation of that rule in a 
prior U.S. case.129 What distinguishes the internationalist approach from the 
voluntarist approach discussed below is that the internationalist approach employs 
the international identification methodology without weighted regard for the 
national internalization of the norm in question. For the purpose of identifying 
customary rules, U.S. courts adopting the internationalist variant mimic the role 
of global actors seeking to ascertain the normativity of an international rule by 
relying upon international sources and evidence. 
Grounding the analysis in international sources also reflects socio-legal 
assumptions about the international legal system, as well as the role of U.S. courts 
therein. In particular, the internationalist approach reflects key assumptions about 
the normative source and legitimacy of international legal rules.130 As it pertains 
 
126  See Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 
105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 411 (1999). 
127  See, for example, United States v. Buck, 690 F. Supp. 1291, 1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (considering U.S. 
practice in reaction to Protocol I of the Geneva Convention as evidence of the lack of general 
assent of states); United States v. Enger, 472 F.Supp. 490, 504–06 (D.N.J. 1978) (ILC codification 
of customary international law on diplomatic intercourse and immunities as well as U.S. case law 
establish that employees of international organizations do not enjoy certain diplomatic immunities); 
Aboitiz & Co. v. Price, 99 F.Supp. 602, 610 (D. Utah 1951) (treating the U.S. Army Basic Field 
Manual as one of numerous sources considered to identify international law regarding belligerent 
occupation).  
128  291 U.S. 361, 369 (1934). 
129  289 U.S. 137, 158–59 (1933) (citing United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249 (1893)).  
130  See IAN CLARK, LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 207 (2007) (arguing that “the notion of 
legitimacy is always mediated through a composite of other norms.”); BARKER, supra note 80, at 28 
(describing the process of legitimation as “an active, contested political process, rather than 
legitimacy as an abstract political resource”); FRANCK, supra note 79, at 26–29 (describing 
“legitimacy” as “that attribute of a rule which conduces to the belief that it is fair because it was 
made and is applied in accordance with right process”) (internal quotation marks omitted); HENKIN, 
supra note 79, at 51. 
To acknowledge this fact is not to concede that legitimacy loses its pro-social 
content, but rather allows one to simultaneously access its 
characteristics . . . while confronting the reality that legitimacy is not the divine 
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to the uncertain terrain of CIL, for courts following the internationalist approach, 
both methodological and substantive normativity is conceived to arise externally 
to the U.S. So viewed, answers to questions regarding the normative force of 
torture prohibitions, for example, arise from the international legal system. That 
is to say, for the purposes of CIL, courts adopting the internationalist approach 
operate within a legal system and social context that extends beyond the U.S. The 
applicable primary and secondary rules, as well as the legitimacy accorded such 
rules, thus emanate from the international plane. 
As elaborated in Section IV, legitimacy as a socio-legal concept is understood 
by reference to the societal frame of analysis. International law neatly illustrates 
the contingent, relational character of legitimacy. From the standpoint of the 
internationalist approach, questions of legitimacy arise on the international plane 
from the vantage point of states and other international actors. The legitimacy of 
a rule is a function of the relationship between states and is mediated through the 
lens of the international legal system. If the international legal system did not play 
a mediating role, and did not do so effectively, the system could not be 
normatively coherent. As articulated by the Second Circuit, “[t]he requirement 
that a rule command the ‘general assent of civilized nations’ to become binding 
upon them all is a stringent one. Were this not so, the courts of one nation might 
feel free to impose idiosyncratic legal rules upon others, in the name of applying 
international law.”131 To ensure the legitimacy of the application of a rule of CIL, 
then, requires faithful adherence to the internationally agreed approach. 
Indeed, those courts adopting the internationalist approach can be 
understood to be enacting the institutionalized model of the international legal 
system for identifying CIL. H.L.A. Hart’s conceptual distinction between primary 
and secondary rules further illuminates the institutional dimension. According to 
Hart, law may be understood as comprising both primary rules, that is, substantive 
rules of conduct, as well as secondary rules, which are rules that operationalize the 
legal system.132 By incorporating the prevailing international methodology, the 
internationalist approach assumes that international law is a discrete system of law, 
with its own substantive rules of conduct, as well as its own secondary rules to 
assess the validity and existence of such rules.133 This recognition also implicitly 
acknowledges that methodological consistency is critical to the functioning of 
 
providence of kings and saints. Rather, legitimacy standards are the product of 
advocates, academic, practitioners and pundits, all contributing to shift the 
terms of what is acceptable in the eyes of the greater public. 
131  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 
1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1995).  
132  See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 77–79 (1961). 
133  See, for example, Shan v. China Construction Bank, No. 09 Civ. 8566, 2010 WL 2595095, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2010) (following Second Circuit precedent holding that that standards of liability 
for certain claims are questions of international law).  
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CIL, and that courts and judges are, as it pertains to the identification of CIL, 
operating within the international institutional environment. 
The internationalist approach may also reflect the notion, which is taken for 
granted at the international level, that CIL is a dynamic construct, subject to 
affirmation, contestation, or evolution through the dialogical interaction of 
national and international actors.134 Judges following this approach are thus 
accessing and contributing jurisprudence to the fluid development of international 
legal rules. This approach reflects the dynamic horizontal and vertical integration 
and interaction characteristic of the international legal system and transnational 
legal orders.135 The development of CIL, in particular, relies on such recursive 
transnational information flows.136 As noted by the Supreme Court, the indefinite 
nature of customary rules accords courts a critical role in this regard: 
“[i]nternational law, or the law that governs between states, has at times, like the 
common law within states, a twilight existence during which it is hardly 
distinguishable from morality or justice, till at length the imprimatur of a court 
attests its jural quality.”137 
Despite the approach of internationalist courts, the legitimacy of 
international law, particularly when considered by national courts, is a multi-planar 
issue. The identification and application of CIL in U.S. courts also raises questions 
of local legitimacy, as mediated by the taken-for-granted logics of the U.S. legal 
 
134  See United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 486 (1887) (citing international acceptance of the view 
that law of nations against counterfeiting of another nation’s currency “extended to . . . [the] more 
recent custom among bankers of dealing in foreign securities”); Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 
2d 259, 276–77 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Authorities recognize that the growth of int’l law is evolutionary. 
It expands by accretion as consensus develops among nations around widely recognized customs, 
practices and principles, and not by patchwork elevation of any one country’s ad hoc 
pronouncements.”); Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 623 (indicating that “‘law of nations’ connotes a 
changing body of law,” and the definition of piracy must therefore be assessed “according to the 
international consensus definition at the time of the alleged offense”); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 
Wheat.) 66, 121–22 (1825) (finding that, at the time of its examination, the law of nations did not 
prohibit the slave trade, but signalling that this could change over time); see also Anthony J. 
Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and 
International law, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 121, 140–41 (2007) (suggesting “[t]hat the founders viewed the 
law of nations as a developing body of rules that might grow to include new offenses may even be 
implicit in the text of the Offences Clause [of Article I, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution]”). 
135  See generally TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds. 2015) 
(describing the recursive interaction amongst national and international entities across a variety of 
areas, including climate change, human rights, trade, and financial services).  
136  See, for example, Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28–30 (1942) (reviewing the military manuals of several 
countries, numerous treaties, and the Hague Convention signed by 44 nations to establish that “by 
universal agreement and practice, the law of war draws a distinction between the armed forces and 
the peaceful populations of belligerent nations”). 
137  New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 383 (1934).  
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system.138 Such efforts to reconcile the national logics with the plural demands of 
the international legal system may explain the voluntarist approach to CIL. 
2. The Voluntarist Approach 
For courts exhibiting the voluntarist approach, the problem of plural 
institutional environments is resolved by giving weighted deference to the 
institutionalized methods of the U.S. legal system. Rather than analyzing the 
practice of states on the basis of a balanced review of international sources—as 
the cited international method requires—the voluntarist approach ascribes 
particular weight to U.S. practice with respect to the norm in question.139 After 
invocation of the international method, the court will typically consult higher U.S. 
courts to determine if the identification question has previously been answered 
domestically. And where U.S. practice and international practice broadly align, 
U.S. adherence to the norm is employed to legitimize the customary rule’s 
application.140 
Courts following the voluntarist approach consider U.S. practice to be 
elemental to the identification assessment. This added weight accorded to national 
practice is criticized in international circles for its perceived failure to recognize 
the rationality of the internationalized rule-formation process.141 By straying from 
strict consideration of the formal emergence of international rules among 
international actors on the international plane, according to the ILC and others, 
national judges fail to respect the separation between the making and adjudication 
 
138  FRANK J. LECHNER & JOHN BOLI, WORLD CULTURE: ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES, 21 (2005) 
(“Any given social situation typically involves numerous different levels of social reality 
simultaneously; the global may be only one of many levels of reality, and multiple polities, more or 
less formally structured, may be relevant at one and the same time.”).  
139  It should be noted at the outset that weighted emphasis on U.S. acceptance is a distinct, albeit 
related, inquiry to the question of whether a treaty is self-executing in the U.S. See Khulumani v. 
Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 283 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring) (noting with 
disfavor that the district court had “overstated the weight [the Second Circuit] ha[s] placed on the 
self-executing status of a treaty in our consideration of its weight as evidence of customary 
international law”). 
140  See, for example, In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946) (relying heavily on U.S. cases to 
affirm application of international rules on prisoner-of-war status reflected in the Hague 
Convention of 1907 and several treatises); United States v. Melekh, 190 F. Supp. 67, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 
1960) (finding that the U.S. diplomatic immunities statute is “generally declaratory of international 
law” and is “designed to give it a specific local application”); Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 864–
65 (D. Md. 1961) (citing only U.S. cases and a U.S. treatise to establish the legal significance of 
passports under the law of nations); Cobb v. United States, 191 F.2d 604, 607–11 (9th Cir. 1951) 
(citing to U.S. cases and U.S. scholars to determine whether Okinawa was a “foreign country” such 
that the U.S. would be free from tort liability for accidents occurring there). 
141  “Rationality” in this context is not used to denote a value judgment, but rather the notion developed 
by Max Weber that a law is “rational” to the extent it follows a dispassionate process of legislative 
rulemaking. See Clarence Morris, Law, Reason, and Sociology, 107 U. PA. L. Rev. 147, 148–50 (1958). 
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of CIL.142 Alternatively, as viewed through the political lens of foreign and 
international relations, according additional weight to national practice may be 
explained as a manifestation of American exceptionalism. What this Article seeks 
to offer is a contrasting account, grounded in the overlapping social and 
institutional spheres implicated by identification questions.143 
There is a long history of voluntarism in the identification methodology of 
U.S. courts. As far back as 1796, in Ware v. Hylton, the Supreme Court found that 
“the relaxation or departure from the strict rights of war to confiscate private 
debts by the commercial nations of Europe was not binding on the State of 
Virginia, because founded on custom only, she was at liberty to reject or adopt 
the custom as she pleased.”144 The Court distinguished customary law from the 
general law of nations, which is “established by the general consent of mankind, 
and binds all nations.”145 This distinction also maps onto the long-running, 
theoretical divide between citizenship and human rights. According to the 
citizenship conception, rights flow from participation and connection to a discrete 
society, whereas the human rights framework posits that rights emanate from 
universalistic (and naturalistic) ideals intrinsic to human nature.146 
The modern-day voluntarist approach remains grounded in notions of 
consent and state enforcement of territorially delimited social protections. 
Voluntarist courts acknowledge the legitimacy of the international method yet 
deviate from its instructions in order to ensure the norm’s legitimacy within 
territorial order of U.S. society.147 In certain cases, courts exhibit voluntarism when 
 
142  See id. at 156 (contrasting the formalism of Max Weber with Judge Cardozo’s “method of 
sociology”).   
143  See KEN MORRISON, MARX, DURKHEIM, WEBER: FORMATIONS OF MODERN SOCIAL THOUGHT 5–6 
(2d ed. 2006) (“The fundamental insight by Weber that society could not be understood without 
looking at the role played by the overlapping social and institutional spheres cannot be 
overestimated . . . To the extent that Weber’s theory of social action called Durkheim’s focus on 
external social facts and restraint into question, the concepts changed once again. Weber’s stress on 
the role played by ‘judgment’ and ‘evaluation’ in human social action shifted the investigative focus 
from the external social rules and ‘outer states’ described by Durkheim to the ‘inner states’ of actors 
and the necessity of integrating human inner states into a theory of society.”). 
144  3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 227 (1796).  
145  Id.  
146  See Thomas Janoski & Brian Gran, Political Citizenship: Foundations of Rights, in HANDBOOK OF 
CITIZENSHIP STUDIES 13, 13–14 (Engin F. Isin & Bryan S. Turner eds., 2002); Bryan S. Turner, 
Sociology of Human Rights, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 82, 85–
86 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2013). Note that citizenship rights, in this sense, are grounded in 
Durkheimian notions of organic solidarity, where rules are constitutive of the social system, and 
“new elements cannot be grafted on to the old ones without disturbing their harmony . . . .” ÉMILE 
DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 105 (1997). 
147  As developed by Max Weber, the legitimacy of a rule is recognized even through evasion or 
disobedience. MAX WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 4 (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward 
Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., 1967). Voluntarist courts feel obligated to reference the international 
method and its validity. Indeed, Weber recognizes that “one and the same individual may orient his 
conduct toward mutually contradictory orders.” Id.  
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seeking to confirm whether a relevant U.S. statute follows the international rule 
in question. In Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, for example, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cited a U.S. Court of Appeals decision, the 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (“the 
Restatement”), and the legislative history of the U.S. Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA) to establish that the international rule on valid takings had 
been adopted by the U.S.148 The court found that the FSIA “reveals a similar 
understanding of what constitutes a taking in violation of international law.”149 
Yet the voluntarist analysis of U.S. practice is not limited to instances where 
there is formal consent.150 In Amerada Hess v. Argentine Republic, for example, the 
court first examined international treaties and conventions to identify the 
customary international right of a neutral ship to free passage on the high seas, 
before turning to an in-depth treatment of U.S. practice on the subject. The court 
canvassed additional accords adopted by the U.S. supporting the customary right, 
as well as judicial decisions, academic writings, and the Restatement, which all 
recognize and accept the identified norm.151 The court thus adapted the 
international model to allow for in-depth, weighted consideration of U.S. practice 
and norms on the question. Similarly, in Sea Shepherd, as part of a multifaceted 
analysis of the international legal definition of piracy, the court relied on 
international treaties and treatises to identify general consensus at the international 
level before looking to whether U.S. jurisprudence agreed with the consensus 
definition of piracy.152 
This modification of the international model to account for U.S. practice 
and consent has also arisen in cases where the content of CIL is uncertain. In 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, the Second Circuit considered the 
international evidence in light of prevailing U.S. practice to determine whether 
there exists an affirmative obligation on states to compensate for expropriation 
under international law.153 The court’s international inquiry focused on the 
practice of various states, as well as international court judgments, General 
Assembly resolutions and a variety of American and non-American writings, 
before turning to a review of U.S. practice.154   
 
148  Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 711–12 (9th Cir. 1992).  
149  Id. 
150  See, for example, Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 723, 757 (citing a range of international 
conventions and U.N. General Assembly resolutions before considering specifically whether “[l]aws 
of the United States dealing with foreign relations also suggest that [cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment] is a violation of international law”.).  
151  Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 424–27 (2d Cir. 1987).  
152  Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1231–33. 
153  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 888 (2d Cir. 1981).  
154  Id. at 888–92. 
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While the practice of various other states identified by the Second Circuit 
favored a range of different standards, including “appropriate compensation” or 
no compensation, U.S. practice favored full compensation. Faced with “at best a 
confusing picture as to what the consensus may be as to the responsibilities of an 
expropriating nation to pay . . . ,” the court modified the inquiry to consider 
whether international law “never requires an expropriating state to pay more than 
partial compensation.”155 In other words, rather than relying on its inconclusive 
international evaluation of whether there is an affirmative duty to always fully or 
partially compensate, the Second Circuit reframed the issue in the inverse. The 
court considered whether there is a categorical international rule indicating that 
full compensation is never required. By reframing the issue in this way, the Second 
Circuit cleared the ground for application of whatever standard is considered to 
be fair and just in U.S. courts. While it stopped short of recognizing any particular 
standard of compensation, the court’s identification exercise, as mediated through 
the lens of U.S. practice, resulted in a permissive compensation standard.156 
The Banco Nacional exercise makes the socio-legal dimension of the 
voluntarist approach quite plain. Rather than conceiving of the identification 
exercise as simply a matter of identifying and following an existing international 
rule, the Second Circuit sought to identify a point of normative convergence. In 
doing so, the court adapted the international model, conditioned its analysis on 
the basis of prevailing U.S. practice, and applied a norm that ostensibly could be 
reconciled with the institutional logics of both legal systems. 
A consistent contemporary manifestation of the voluntarist approach has 
also arisen in Alien Tort Statute (ATS) cases. Following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, courts have considered whether a norm is 
universally recognized under the law of nations, and whether it is “sufficiently 
definite to support a cause of action” under the federal common law.157 Though 
application of the ATS presents a number of considerations specific to U.S. law,158 
 
155  Id. at 891–92. 
156  Interestingly, in an earlier case presenting similar questions, the U.S. Supreme Court, in an 
internationalist spirit, declined to pass on the validity of the Cuban government’s expropriation of 
a foreign-owned corporation’s assets, noting the sharply conflicting views on the issue among 
capital-exporting and capital-importing nations, as well as among socialist and capitalist nations. See 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 430 (1964).  
157  542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004); see also Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009); Forti v. 
Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1542–43 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (“Before this Court may adjudicate a 
tort claim under § 1350, it must be satisfied that the legal standard it is to apply is one with universal 
acceptance and definition; on no other basis may the Court exercise jurisdiction over a claimed 
violation of the law of nations.”). 
158  These include whether the universal norm is clearly defined, whether the relevant conduct was 
within the U.S. and whether a private right of action exists. See, for example, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013) (presumption against extraterritoriality applies to ATS 
claims); Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 189 (2d Cir. 2013) (claims barred under Kiobel 
because relevant conduct occurred outside the U.S.); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725 (finding that new causes 
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the predicate question of whether a norm is universally recognized is an 
identification question, and U.S. recognition of the norm has on numerous 
occasions played a primary role.159 
Take the example of Roe v. Bridgestone Corp.160  To ascertain whether there was 
an international law prohibition on forced labor, the court concluded that “[i]t 
would be odd indeed if a U.S. court were to treat as universal and binding in other 
nations an international convention that the U.S. government has declined to 
ratify itself.”161 There was no dispute that the U.S. had not ratified International 
Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 29 and its definition of forced labor. But 
the plaintiffs argued that the U.S. later bound itself to Convention 29 by the ILO’s 
adoption of the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.162  
The court did not analyze whether those sources reflected a general practice of 
states accepting a definition of forced labor as law. Rather, the lynchpin of the 
argument was that the U.S. had not accepted the norm.163 
The district court in Abdullahi v. Pfizer took a similar approach.164 To evaluate 
whether there existed an international rule proscribing medical experimentation, 
the court relied on U.S. practice. The court first pointed to the fact that the U.S. 
had not ratified the international standards governing biomedical research known 
as the Nuremberg Code.165 Then, the court indicated that the Nuremberg Code 
“has not been adopted by the international community.”166 In this way the 
Abdullahi court, like the other courts following the voluntarist approach, afforded 
considerable weight to U.S. practice in assessing whether there exists international 
consensus.167 
 
of action may be recognized under the ATS only if they “rest on a norm of international character 
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 
18th-century paradigms [the Supreme Court has] recognized”).  
159  See, for example, Mujica v. Occidental Petroelum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1178–79, 1181 (C.D. 
Cal. 2005) (finding that the existence of a domestic statute such as the Torture Victim Protection 
Act “is strong evidence that the prohibition against torture is a binding customary international law 
norm” and that “[b]ased on the Geneva Conventions and their incorporation into the [U.S.] War 
Crimes Act of 1996, . . . there is a customary international law norm against attacks against civilians 
as war crimes”); Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1541 (ATS suit alleging official torture). 
160  492 F. Supp. 2d 988 (S.D. Ind. 2007) 
161  Id. at 1015.  
162  Id.  
163  Id. at 1012, 1015. 
164  Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 8118, 2005 WL 1870811 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev’d, 562 F.d 163 
(2d Cir. 2009). 
165  Id. at *11 (citing cases from the Supreme Court and other courts finding that the Nuremburg Code 
has not been adopted as law in the U.S.). 
166  Id.  
167  See also Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 185 (D. Mass. 1995) (evaluating international 
agreements alongside U.S. court decisions to determine existence of international consensus on the 
prohibitions of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment). 
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U.S. courts’ subsidiary reliance on the Restatement, a treatise written by the 
American Law Institute (ALI), may also reflect a voluntarist approach. On many 
occasions, support for a customary international rule is grounded in the 
Restatement.168 This may of course reflect considerations of expedience as it may 
not be practicable for courts to revisit an identification analysis previously 
undertaken by the ALI. In certain instances, the Restatement authors have already 
conducted an extensive examination of international evidence. Moreover, federal 
judges are often not as well-versed in international law as the contributors to the 
Restatement.169 
Nevertheless, in discussing reliance on the Restatement, it should also be 
recalled why the ILC cautions against reliance on scholarly writings and the 
products of collective bodies such as the ALI: such writings may reflect the 
national or individual positions of the authors.170 The Restatement acknowledges 
that it sets out to restate the foreign relations law of the U. S., that is, international 
law viewed as applicable to the U.S. rather than by the international community.171 
Accordingly, courts that rely on the Restatement and the foreign relations law of 
the U.S. as a subsidiary, yet required, precondition to the rule’s legitimacy, would 
appear to take for granted that voluntary acceptance of the customary rule by the 
U.S. legal community is fundamental to the identification analysis. 
Viewed through a sociological lens, this practice of according weight to U.S. 
acceptance of a rule may describe a process of localization or translation. The 
localization of global norms is a process of assessing the global to ensure 
congruence with the local.172 That is, the legitimacy of a global rule is mediated 
through established local norms.173 In effect, U.S. courts following the voluntarist 
 
168  See, for example, Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14, 22 (D.D.C. 2000) (relying exclusively on the 
Restatement for proposition that “forced prison labor is not a state practice proscribed by 
international law”).  
169  See Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39, 49 (1994) 
(“Modern jurists also are notably lacking in the diplomatic experience of early Justices such as John 
Jay and John Marshall, who were familiar with the law of nations and comfortable navigating by 
it.”).  
170  Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/71/10, at 111 
(2016).  
171  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 1 (AM. L. 
INST. 1987). U.S. courts themselves have recognized this limitation of the Restatement, at least 
according to norms of the international legal system. See, for example, ARC Ecology v. U.S. Dept. of 
Air Force, 411 F.3d 1092, 1002 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005) (“However respectable the Restatement may be, 
it ‘is not a primary source of authority upon which, standing alone, courts may rely for propositions 
of customary international law.’”) (quoting Yousef, 327 F.3d at 99).  
172  See Amitav Acharya, How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change 
in Asian Regionalism, 58 INT’L ORG. 239 (2004) (describing the process by which local actors 
reconstruct international norms to ensure a better fit with prior local norms). 
173  See CLARK, supra note 130, at 209–26 (describing legitimation through norms generally); WILLIAM 
A. BOGART, CONSEQUENCES: THE IMPACT OF LAW AND ITS COMPLEXITY 75 (2002) (describing 
 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 40 Vol. 21 No. 1 
approach are organizations trying to be “multiple things to multiple people.”174 In 
identifying a customary rule, voluntarist courts reveal the contested identity of 
operating within multiple normative environments and legal discourses. Although 
the nationally derived identity prevails, the international model’s translation into 
the U.S. environment still exhibits the constitutive effect of both institutions. 
Of course, as will be discussed further below, in certain instances the 
adaptation or rejection of the international approach may reflect a prevailing 
uneasiness with normative universalisms,175 a conscious misuse of the applicable 
rules, or a misunderstanding of the international approach. And proponents of 
the positivism and universalism of international law would likely lament such an 
account as apologist or unduly relativist. Yet, the normativity of the voluntarist 
approach is not at issue here. Instead, its place in this typology is merely developed 
as a socio-legal alternative to the traditional explanations of national divergence 
grounded in ignorance, inexperience, or exceptionalism.176 When viewed in the 
light of institutional theory, translation of the international model emerges as a 
rationalized method of maintaining legitimacy in a pluralistic environment.177 
3. The Exceptionalist Approach 
The exceptionalist approach bypasses the international approach in favor of 
national doctrines and logics. Most notably, this approach generally foregoes 
international sources in favor of U.S. foreign relations law. Although it is outside 
the scope of this analysis to speculate as to any ideological underpinnings of this 
approach,178 it merits attention here because of its subtle, but important, contrast 
with the voluntarist approach. Rather than requiring U.S. acceptance of an 
internationally agreed rule, the exceptionalist approach evaluates a rule primarily 
 
internalization as the process by which “people accept a law when they come to believe in a society’s 
underlying values”).  
174  Kraatz & Block, supra note 22, at 244 (quoting CLARK KERR, THE USES OF THE UNIVERSITY 8 
(1963)). 
175  LECHNER & BOLI, supra note 138, at 22.  
176  Cf. Yousef, 327 F.3d at 92 n.25 (stating in dicta that: 
[w]hile it is not possible to claim that the practice or policies of any one country, 
including the United States, has such authority that the contours of customary 
international law may be determined by reference only to that country, it is 
highly unlikely that a purported principle of customary international law in direct 
conflict with the recognized practices and customs of the United States and/or 
other prominent players in the community of States could be deemed to qualify 
as a bona fide customary international law principle. 
  Yousef, 327 F.3d at 92 n.25). 
177  See Boyle & Meyer, supra note 68, at 226 (discussing the ideal of legal consistency and observing 
that “[l]egal fictions are devised so that ‘the internal coherence of the new with the old is ensured, 
and thus the systematic unity of the whole law”).  
178  See CALAVITA, supra note 98, at 113 (explaining how the rhetoric of law may be used to mask 
deviations based on personal politics and ideologies). 
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on the basis of U.S. practice without even ceremonial consideration of the two-
element, international test. 
Perhaps the most explicit and consistent example of this approach is in cases 
addressing jurisdictional questions. In Hasan, for example, the court relied 
primarily on the Restatement to assert that, “under international law principles,” 
there exists a so-called “protective principle” of extraterritorial jurisdiction.179 In 
United States v. Robinson, the court relied only on the Restatement and U.S. cases to 
examine the “protective principle.”180 And in United States v. Marino-Garcia, the 
court first employed an internationalist approach—citing to international 
conventions and the works of jurists—to find that states assert jurisdiction over 
stateless vessels, before relying exclusively on U.S. cases and the Restatement to 
support the existence of the protective theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction.181 
Courts have resolved other extraterritorial jurisdiction questions by exclusive 
resort to the Restatement and U.S. practice.182 
Section 402(3) of the Restatement indicates that states have the competence 
to regulate “certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that 
is directed against the security of the state or against a limited class of other state 
interests.”183 Indeed, the Restatement suggests “an expansive state capacity to 
legislate extraterritorial conduct that threatens national security,” and several states 
have codified provisions that follow the general protective rubric reflected in 
Section 402(3).184 Yet, despite some acceptance, the prevailing view at the 
international level is that the Restatement’s interpretation of protective 
jurisdiction does not reflect a rule of CIL.185 Such primary reliance on the 
Restatement, thus, wittingly or unwittingly, identifies a rule that would likely not 
satisfy the two-element approach. 
 
179  747 F. Supp. 2d at 606–07. As noted previously, the Restatement acknowledges that it sets out to 
restate the foreign relations law of the U.S., i.e., the international law viewed as applicable to the 
U.S. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 1 (AM. 
L. INST. 1987). 
180  843 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1988) (relying also on the Restatement to conclude that an international 
agreement regarding territorial jurisdiction may be informal).  
181  679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982). 
182  See, for example, United States v. Roberts, 1 F. Supp. 2d 601, 607 (E.D. La. 1998) (citing the 
Restatement, U.S. cases, and one scholar with respect to passive personality after exclusively citing 
U.S. courts for five distinct theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction). 
183  Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 402(3) (1986). 
184  Noah Bialostozky, Extraterritoriality and National Security: Protective Jurisdiction as a 
Circumstance Precluding Wrongfulness, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 617, 627 (2014). 
185  Id. at 630; see also OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 258 (1991) 
(“[I]t is not evident that a requirement of reasonableness has emerged outside of the United States 
as a rule of international law.”); Cecil J. Olmstead, Jurisdiction, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 468, 472 (1989) 
(disagreeing with the Restatement’s claim that § 403’s reasonableness requirement had emerged as 
a principle of international law); Harold G. Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 
AM. J. COMP. L. 579, 588–89 (1983) (arguing that the interest-balancing approach reflects the 
principle of comity and not an international legal rule). 
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The primary reliance on U.S. practice and the Restatement also extends to 
other areas of law. For example, in Kadic v. Karadzic, to assess whether the plaintiffs 
had asserted international law violations, the court first had to consider whether 
the “Bosnian-Serb” entity headed by Radovan Karadzic in the Balkan conflict of 
the 1990s met the definition of a state, and it did so by relying exclusively on 
Section 201 of the Restatement.186 The Restatement incorporates the criteria for 
recognition of statehood set forth in the treaty known as the Montevideo 
Convention, yet those criteria remain contested as a matter of CIL.187 Even if the 
Montevideo criteria—and thereby the Restatement’s definition—reflect CIL, the 
Karadzic court’s analysis and language remain telling. The court speaks in terms of 
“the Restatement’s definition of statehood” rather than the definition of 
statehood under international law, and cites exclusively to the Restatement to 
support additional rules of CIL.188 The court also relied heavily on U.S. 
jurisprudence, noting that “[o]ur courts have regularly given effect to the ‘state’ 
action of unrecognized states.”189 In totality, the Karadzic court’s assessment 
reflects an evaluation of the U.S.’s posture vis-à-vis the implicated identification 
questions, rather than acceptance of those rules generally at the international level. 
As noted previously, it may be that U.S. courts rely on the Restatement and 
other domestic sources for ease of reference or out of ignorance. Courts may not 
have the resources or know-how to assess international sources, and the authors 
of the Restatement have often conducted voluminous research into the 
identification questions raised. Yet, even if courts are merely resource-constrained 
and reliance on the Restatement is motivated by practical efficiency, that 
assessment should signal as much—in other words, that the Restatement’s rule is 
reflective of international law on the question. Without such an international tie-
in, the exercise remains conspicuously disengaged from legitimate accounts 
produced at the international level.190 The Restatement, as a treatise on U.S. 
foreign relations law, is not viewed within the international legal system as an 
 
186  70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995). 
187  See, for example, Jure Vidmar, The Importance of Legal Criteria for Statehood: A Rejoinder to Dapo Akande, 
EJIL: TALK!: BLOG OF THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Aug. 9, 2013), 
http://perma.cc/9ZW9-CSB5.  
188  Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 245 (“The customary international law of human rights, such as the proscription 
of official torture, applies to states without distinction between recognized and unrecognized 
states.”).  
189  Id. at 244.  
190  For example, in McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. CIV.A.82, 1997 WL 361177, at 
*15 (D.D.C. June 23, 1997), the Restatement was the only standard cited to define takings law under 
international law. This reliance was disputed by Iran, the defendant sovereign in the case, and came 
even though the Restatement itself acknowledges considerable opposition to its interpretation. Id. 
See also Bao Ge, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 22 (relying exclusively on the Restatement for proposition that 
“forced prison labor is not a state practice proscribed by international law”).  
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authoritative restatement of CIL.191 Moreover, the Restatement was published in 
1987, long before many of the identification questions arose. 
Primary or exclusive reliance on U.S. sources also arises from adherence to 
the doctrine of stare decisis. This variant of the exceptionalist approach further 
reveals the socio-legal dimension of identification questions, particularly where 
the questions have been previously addressed by other federal courts, especially 
higher courts of appeal. Precedent is the foundational institutional logic of U.S. 
courts and the common law, and it serves to order the operation of the U.S. legal 
system by stabilizing settled points of law.192 Yet, the doctrine of precedent is 
fundamentally at odds with the nature of CIL. As noted above, customary rules 
are necessarily fluid and dynamic, shifting and evolving in accordance with the 
practice and acceptance of States. Even where customary rules are well settled, the 
institutionalized model followed by international legal actors is to seek 
confirmation from international rather than national sources. 
Despite this apparent contradiction in institutional imperatives, U.S. courts 
routinely rely exclusively on precedent to identify CIL.193 Notably, some courts 
have explicitly rejected the international method in favor of the controlling 
decisions of U.S. appellate courts. For example, in Ali Shafi v. Palestinian Authority, 
the district court found that  
[a] court may look to “the customs and usages of civilized nations; and as 
evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of 
labor, research and commentators, have made themselves peculiarly well 
acquainted with the subjects of which they treat[,]” but only when there is 
“no controlling . . . judicial decision” on that particular subject.194  
 
191  Indeed, in Sosa, the Supreme Court noted that the Restatement, while helpful, is “only the beginning 
of the inquiry.” 542 U.S. at 737. See also Yousef, 327 F.3d at 99 (finding that district court erred in its 
reliance on the Restatement “because such treatises are not primary sources of international law”).  
192  See H.C. Black, The Principle of Stare Decisis, 34 AM. L. REG. 745 (1886). 
193  See Estate of Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (“Customary 
international law, however, is undefined in the Eleventh Circuit. To determine whether violating 
Article 6 of the ICCPR is a violation of customary international law, the Court must first define 
customary international law.”); Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 1154 (citing Ninth Circuit precedent 
recognizing the customary international law prohibition against summary execution); Hain v. 
Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224, 1243–44 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing only U.S. cases to find that juvenile death 
penalty not abolished internationally); Lopez v. Richardson, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1366 (N.D. Ga. 
2009) (observing that one Eleventh Circuit case “would seem to provide sufficient precedential 
basis for a conclusion that Plaintiff’s cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment and 
arbitrary detention claims are not sufficient to establish a violation of customary international law”); 
In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc. Alien Tort Suit and S’holder Derivative Litig., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 
1315 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (beginning inquiry into customary law on terrorism by noting that neither the 
Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit have addressed whether terrorism is a viable cause of 
action under the ATS, then relying on the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab 
Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1091 
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (relying on the Second Circuit’s holding that “official torture is now prohibited by 
the law of nations. The prohibition is clear and unambiguous.”).  
194  686 F. Supp. 2d 23, 29 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734). 
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The court continued by noting that “[D.C. Circuit] precedents are binding here, 
whether or not they reflect an antiquated construction of international norms.”195 
This deference to higher courts also extends to the process of determining 
the content of rules of CIL. Some district courts rely on circuit court guidance on 
how to approach identification questions. In Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., 
for example, the district court relied on the “process of ascertaining customary 
international law” delineated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit.196 Similar deference has been shown to the approach of the Second and 
Third Circuits, among others.197 Leaving aside the temporal issues associated with 
deference to prior appellate decisions,198 the legitimacy assumptions are plain. 
Rather than resort to the international method, courts exhibiting the exceptionalist 
approach explicitly or implicitly favor the institutional logics of the U.S. court 
system. The courts feel constrained by the hierarchical demands institutionalized 
within the U.S juridical field,199 and proceed as strictly national actors in a legal 
system where organizational legitimacy is grounded in the consistency, efficiency, 
and fairness of precedent.200 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The foregoing empirical analysis of U.S. federal court decisions reveals that 
more fine-grained consideration is required to understand how competing 
international and national models shape processes of rule identification. While 
extant international legal studies focus largely on transnational processes of norm 
replacement, or recursive interaction between the national and international levels, 
sociological institutionalism offers a rich theoretical toolkit for unpacking how 
 
195  Id. at 30.  
196  256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1263 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (“[T]he Eleventh Circuit described the process of 
ascertaining customary international law as follows: ‘We look to a number of sources to ascertain 
principles of international law, including international conventions, international customs, treatises, 
and judicial decisions rendered in this and other countries.’”) (quoting Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte 
Fresh Produce, N.A., 179 F.3d 1279, 1295 (11th Cir. 1999)). 
197  See, for example, Jama, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 362 (“The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not 
addressed the question how the law of nations should be determined for the purpose of the ATCA. 
Other courts of appeals have taken varying approaches. According to Restatement . . .  customary 
international law ‘results from a general and consistent practice of states . . . .’”); Almog, 471 F. Supp. 
2d at 281 (“[T]his court has examined the very sources of international law found to be valid by the 
Second Circuit in Kadic, Filartiga, and Yousef, and by the Supreme Court in Sosa.”). 
198  See Estate of Rodriguez, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1264 (confronting the fact that even though no federal 
court has ruled on the question, “this court must evaluate the status of international law at the time 
this lawsuit was brought under the ATCA”). 
199  See Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805 
(1987). 
200  THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 12; KAREN S. COOK ET AL., COOPERATION WITHOUT 
TRUST? 19 (2005); Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Yair Sagy, Courts as Organizations: The Drive for Efficiency 
and the Regulation of Class Action Settlements, 4 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 1 (2016) (reviewing divided 
scholarship on the proper role of efficiency in judicial systems). 
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plural institutional logics interact to shape behavior at the national and sub-
national levels. 
Despite accelerating U.S. integration into world society following World War 
II, federal judges have become increasingly likely to depart from the international 
approach to identifying rules of CIL. In contrast to the globally institutionalized 
two-element approach, U.S. courts have become more likely over time to require 
a third element, namely U.S. consent. Yet, what emerges from this study is that, 
rather than outright rejection of the international model in favor of U.S. consent, 
federal judges often hybridize the approach to identification to maintain legitimacy 
nationally and internationally. That U.S. courts across circuits are increasingly 
likely to resort to a hybrid approach has significant implications for the coherence 
and stability of international law, as well as its legitimacy and salience in the U.S. 
Building from this study, further research is needed to determine whether 
the pattern of legal hybridization identified in U.S. federal cases holds across 
organizational forms, including among administrative agencies and corporations 
subject to competing norms. Additional case studies would enable broader 
insights as to the circumstances under which vested national models are subject 
to hybridization as organizations seek legitimacy in both the international and 
national domains. By going beyond theories of adoption or replacement, such 
studies would offer further insight as to the social circumstances under which 
international models shape national decision-making and organizational change. 
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a) Appendix 1 
 
 
Table 1: OLS regression of annual cases requiring U.S. consent by treaties in force 
 
U.S. consent requirement 
 
Treaties in force per year                                 .00017* 
(7.96e-06) 
 
Appointing party                                             .05 
                                                                       (0.056) 
 
Type of case                                                    -.0249 
                                                                       (0.250) 
                                                                        
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
N = 218 
Source: Westlaw database 
* p<0.05  
 
Notes:  
Treaties in force per year used as a measure for U.S. integration into World Society.  
Appointing party is a dichotomous predictor: 1 = Appointed by Democratic president; 0 = Appointed by 
Republican president 
Type of case is a dichotomous predictor: 1 = civil case; 0 = criminal case. 
This analysis also controlled for the subject matter of the case, as qualitatively coded by the author. 
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b) Appendix 2 
 
Table 2: Logistic regression results for variables predicting type of identification approach 
  
                                                                       Voluntarist                                 Internationalist 
 
Predictor                                                      RRR         P-value                         RRR        P-value 
 
Treaties in force per year                              1.000048    0.261                          1.000148    0.02* 
 
Appointing party                                          1.23594      0.389                          1.582322    0.233 
 
Type of case                                                 1.85136      0.134                          1.563627    0.371 
                                                                        
 
Source: Westlaw database 
* p<0.05  
N = 218 
 
Notes:  
Reference group is the exceptionalist approach (designation as voluntarist, internationalist, exceptionalist 
was coded by the author; qualitative coding results are on file with the author).  
Treaties in force per year used as a measure for U.S. integration into World Society.  
Appointing party is a dichotomous predictor: 1 = Appointed by Democratic president; 0 =   
Appointed by Republican president 
Type of case is a dichotomous predictor: 1 = civil case; 0 = criminal case 
This analysis also controlled for the subject matter of the case, as qualitatively coded by the author. 
 
 
